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The Compact of Free Association (COFA), a 1986 treaty between the United 
States and the Federated States of Micronesia (FSM), formalizes a specific type of shared 
sovereignty: free association between politically independent nations. The COFA 
intentionally compromises some aspects of Micronesian sovereignty by ceding limited 
authority to the United States, backed by the FSM’s international legal standing. In 
return, the FSM should gain the political and economic capacity to be more effectively 
sovereign than it could be without external assistance. Whether free association remains 
the best avenue for the FSM to pursue its national goals depends on how sovereign 
authority is maintained. Does the COFA undermine the FSM’s political authority in order 
to support U.S. strategic interests, or does it properly leverage the FSM’s international 
legal standing and greater U.S. capacity in support of mutual interests? A critical look at 
international legal norms and shared sovereignty regimes, followed by a qualitative cost-
benefit analysis with respect to sovereignty, might best answer that question. The results 
suggest necessary modifications to the U.S.–FSM COFA, as well as a revised 
understanding of free association and its potential effects on sovereignty. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
This thesis explores the relationship between free association agreements and 
sovereignty, using the Federated States of Micronesia (FSM) as a single case study. 
Along with the Republic of Palau (ROP) and the Republic of the Marshall Islands (RMI), 
the FSM is one of three sovereign Pacific states in a Compact of Free Association 
(COFA) with the United States.1 Under the terms of the COFA, the United States 
maintains the responsibility and authority for the islands’ security, in exchange for 
Micronesian rights to settle in the United States and its territories, along with direct 
financial aid and government services.2 The FSM is a developing nation, with an 
economic model known as MIRAB—in which growth is based on migration, remittances, 
aid, and bureaucracy.3 This arrangement is by definition not self-sufficient, though it 
might be sustainable despite the low levels of economic growth observed in the islands. 
The COFA reinforces the MIRAB structure—providing a form of economic 
sovereignty—and allows the FSM to pursue public sector-led development while 
maintaining a level of services, such as security, transportation, communication, and 
education, normally associated with a larger export-driven economy. 
The COFA fills a gap in the FSM’s capacity to participate in the global economy, 
but it is more than just a partnership of convenience. Like the other former colonies in 
greater Micronesia, the FSM—with a land area smaller than the island of Oahu but 
possessing the world’s 18th largest Exclusive Economic Zone—has drawn the attention of 
                                                 
1 On naming conventions: just as “Americans” refers to the people of the United States within the 
greater region of the Americas, this thesis will use “Micronesians” only when referring to citizens of the 
Federated States of Micronesia. Other peoples from the region of Micronesia will be referred to according 
to either indigenous nationality (e.g., Chamorro) or to the specific island or group of their origin. (e.g., 
Marshallese, Marianas Islanders, or Palauans). The Federated States of Micronesia (FSM), Republic of 
Palau (ROP), and Republic of the Marshall Islands (RMI) make up the Freely Associated States (FAS) and 
will be distinguished from “Micronesia” in the text. 
2 Compact of Free Association: Agreement Between the United States of America and Micronesia, 
May 14, 2003, TIAS 04–625. 
3 I.G. Bertram and R. F. Watters, “The MIRAB Economy in South Pacific Microstates,” Pacific 
Viewpoint 26, no. 3 (1985): 497. 
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large nations other than the United States, prompting concern that local economic 
interests might be subordinated to global strategic interests.4 The United States benefits 
from the exclusion of other militaries from FSM territory provided in the COFA, but does 
the reciprocal benefit to the FSM provide fair value? Though the FSM maintains its de 
jure sovereignty, whether the relationship with the United States represents balanced 
interdependence is continually debated at the highest levels of both governments.5 The 
FSM is not a colony, nor is it a territory or commonwealth—but there is a fine line in this 
case between mutual assistance and dependency. 
The current political and economic situation in the FSM underscores the major 
research question explored in this thesis: How can a freely associated state—a smaller 
entity seeking the economic benefits of political interdependence with a larger one—
maintain its sovereignty? To answer this main question, three lines of inquiry are 
necessary. First, what internal and external factors cause a country like the FSM to seek 
political and economic symbiosis with another? Second, which structural elements in the 
Compact of Free Association between the FSM and the United States reinforce 
sovereignty, and which elements undermine it? Finally, what structural adjustments can 
be made to the existing treaty—up to and including termination—to reinforce FSM 
sovereignty while serving the interests of both parties? The answers to these lines of 
inquiry will directly address the pros and cons of free association as a political strategy 
for small island nations, and identify the conditions that lead to sustainable political and 
economic development while minimizing a loss of sovereignty for the freely associated 
state. 
                                                 
4 Thomas R. Matelski, “America’s Micronesia Problem,” The Diplomat, February 19, 2016, 
http://thediplomat.com/2016/02/americas-micronesia-problem; Adam Thompson, “Tourism in Yap and 
Micronesia: Will China Run the Show?,” Asia Pacific Bulletin 1, no. 199 (2013): 1. 
5 FSM Congress, C.R. No. 19–155: Resolution Requesting Termination of the Amended Compact of 
Free Association with the United States, Nineteenth Congress of the Federated States of Micronesia, Third 
Special Session (Palikir, 19 November 2015). 
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B. SOVEREIGNTY AS A FUNCTION OF AUTHORITY AND CAPACITY 
Why is sovereignty important? According its most basic definition, sovereignty is 
“a country’s independent authority and the right to govern itself.”6 This concept forms 
the basis for a country to participate in the international system, as well as the recognized 
right to be supreme in its own territory. In theory, sovereignty still has meaning 
regardless of a country’s capacity to enforce it; in practice, it is frequently compromised 
by the unequal distribution of economic and military power. The participation of small 
island nations in the global economy as legally sovereign states presents a paradox. The 
increased capacity required to maintain diplomatic relations, provide networks for 
disaster relief, defend territory, and benefit from an Exclusive Economic Zone may be 
beyond the reach of a small island economy. Small islands may pursue governance 
delegation agreements with larger nations in order to protect their interests; depending on 
how they are managed, these agreements may not only favor the larger partner, but may 
erode rather than protect the smaller partner’s sovereignty.7 This thesis defines the COFA 
as an attempt to rectify what Stephen Krasner calls the “organized hypocrisy” of 
sovereignty.8 The resulting relationship is best explained as a formal compromise of 
some aspects of sovereignty with the aim of strengthening others. Has free association 
succeeded in this aim? 
Unlike other forms of governance delegation, the COFA treaties between the 
United States and the ROP, FSM, and RMI are specifically designed to preserve local 
sovereignty, emphasizing the islands’ right to withdraw from free association should the 
relationship prove no longer beneficial. This opt-out clause is formalized in U.S. Code as 
well as in the COFA itself. Unlike Niue and the Cook Islands in the South Pacific, “freely 
associated” states which are officially part of the Realm of New Zealand, the three COFA 
nations in the North Pacific are effectively not under any U.S. authority except that which 
                                                 
6 Merriam-Webster Online, s.v. “Sovereignty,” http://merriam-webster.com. 
7 Aila M. Matanock, “Governance Delegation Agreements: Shared Sovereignty as a Substitute for 
Limited Statehood,” Governance 27, no. 4 (2014): 589.  
8 Stephen Krasner, Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999), 
42. 
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they have requested—a voluntary, though asymmetric, interdependent relationship 
formalized in a renewable contract. 
C. THE FSM’S ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL CHALLENGES 
Of the Micronesian freely associated states (FAS), the FSM presents a unique 
problem set. The four federated states of Yap, Chuuk, Pohnpei, and Kosrae, a mix of high 
islands and low coral atolls, are geographically dispersed and lack infrastructure. As 
such, they are not as ideally suited for tourism as are the close-grouped rock islands of 
Palau. There are no permanent U.S. bases, like Kwajalein’s Reagan Test Site in the 
Marshalls—nor, perhaps more cynically, does the FSM have the potential to receive 
reparations for U.S. atomic bomb testing, as the RMI does for the destruction of Bikini, 
Enewetak, and Rongelap Atolls and the forced relocation of their inhabitants. The 
remaining option for economic growth is fishing, which has so far not benefited the FSM 
aside from a limited source of rents. The COFA was originally designed to shelter a 
naturally-grown Micronesian economy by providing public services until such time as the 
FSM government could build its own capacity. More than thirty years after its inception, 
the COFA has arguably failed to truly strengthen the FSM economy, regardless of the 
increase in GDP actually provided. 
Today, the FSM’s government is large in proportion to its workforce; 
furthermore, approximately half of government spending is supported by Compact aid.9 
Direct economic aid provisions in the COFA expire in 2023, when proceeds from a trust 
fund established in a 2003 revision are expected to partially replace U.S. grants. Despite 
the good health of the FSM trust fund relative to that of its neighbors, GDP growth has 
been slow or negative; the country is approaching a “fiscal cliff” in which the 
government will not be able to meet its projected obligations.10 
                                                 
9 “The World Factbook: Federated States of Micronesia,” Central Intelligence Agency, accessed 
August 2, 2016, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/fm.html. 
10 Government of the Federated States of Micronesia, “FSM 2023 Action Plan,” Asian Development 
Bank release (Palikir, FSM, 2015), 8. https://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/linked-documents/cobp-fsm-
2016-2018-ld-02. 
 5 
This apparent structural weakness might be a natural result of the FSM’s small 
land area and dispersed population, but the United States’ role should not be overlooked. 
The relationship between the governments is intended to be symbiotic, but some 
Micronesian legislators have recently proposed an early termination date for the 
Compact, citing among other things an imbalance of power in the U.S.–FSM Joint 
Economic Management Committee (JEMCO) and a perception that the relationship has 
not been mutually beneficial.11 Was this a purely a political statement, or is there truth to 
the notion that administration of the COFA has undermined Micronesian sovereignty, and 
prevented true economic and political self-determination? Regardless of its true 
motivation, the anti-COFA movement marks a change in political posture, and should not 
be ignored. The strategic value of COFA Title III, which forecloses FSM territory to any 
but U.S. military forces, should be apparent considering the lessons of World War II in 
the Pacific. 
While the congressional resolution to end the FSM COFA in 2018 did not pass—
the FSM must hold a plebiscite to unilaterally terminate the agreement—it is apparent 
that many economic issues faced by Micronesians are tied to the Compact relationship.12 
An influx of politicized “strategic” aid designed to offset American contributions has 
subordinated island interests to a larger power struggle between donor states, while the 
uneven distribution of aid monies has caused a political crisis in Chuuk and Yap states.13 
Furthermore, the pressing requirements of participation in the international system, 
brought on by the FSM’s international legal status as a sovereign state, may be expanding 
the federal government’s mandate beyond its capacity.  
The colonial history of Micronesia as a whole complicates the situation, as some 
citizens view the Compact as a neocolonial push by the United States to secure its 
                                                 
11 FSM Congress, C.R. No. 19–155. 
12 U.S.–FSM Compact of Free Association, Title IV, Art. IV, Sec. 443. 
13 Matelski, “America’s Micronesia Problem”; John Connell, “The New Micronesia: Pitfalls and 
Problems of Dependent Development,” Pacific Studies 14, no. 2 (1991): 112. 
http://search.proquest.com/docview/1311896973. 
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interests at the expense of a disadvantaged local population.14 While the April 2016 bill 
terminating the COFA was a political gesture and did not pass, other efforts may have a 
visible effect. Another measure, which created a study concerning leasing the entire FSM 
EEZ to one nation—“possibly the People’s Republic of China”15—was adopted. The 
FSM’s alignment with the United States and its interests is not guaranteed, especially as 
power is transferred to a generation of Micronesian leaders born after World War II. Title 
IV of the Compact provides for unilateral severance through a Micronesian plebiscite; the 
president cannot personally terminate the agreement, but 75 percent of FSM citizens 
could. It is clear that perception matters when it comes to sovereignty. 
What is the desired end state? If the FSM terminates the Compact, it would 
theoretically lose not only U.S. protection—whether or not it needs it—but each of the 
COFA legal provisions that sustain true interdependence between governments. U.S. 
official language regarding the COFA frequently mentions self-sufficiency as a goal for 
2023, as if FSM sovereignty is contingent on an independent economy. Decades of 
colonialism and war, however, have disrupted many of the informal networks that would 
permit some degree of self-sufficiency or self-reliance. The post-World War II period of 
progressive decolonization saw many imperfect solutions for restoring economic growth 
and trade, such as the U.S.-administered Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands (TTPI). 
Consequently, the options for a future relationship between the United States and the 
FSM are not presented in terms of a restoration of symbiosis and interdependence, but in 
terms of a return to paternalism and dependency. 
The political situation between the FSM and the United States is fraught with 
misunderstanding, even at the highest levels. As a result, the most effective parts of the 
COFA—those that lead to true economic development and might insulate the FSM from 
economic shocks—have been set aside or deemphasized. Following the analysis, this 
thesis will attempt to show that not only can the United States safely discontinue 
Compact direct aid in 2023 without giving up its strategic interest, but that Micronesian 
                                                 
14 Francis J. Hezel, S.J., “Yesterday’s Myths, Today’s Realities,” Micronesian Seminar online, 
accessed May 8, 2017, http://www.micsem.org/pubs/articles/economic/frames/yestmythfr.htm. 
15 FSM Congress, C.R. No. 16–89: Resolution Urging Restricted Access to the EEZ, Sixteenth 
Congress of the Federated States of Micronesia, Fourth Regular Session (Palikir, 25 May 2010). 
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interests will be served as well. Namely, the FSM can keep its remittance economy, 
relieve population pressures, avoid the need to field and fund a military, and preserve the 
many aspects of its sovereignty. It can also accept needed economic aid and disaster 
relief assistance from all countries—including the United States—without expectations of 
reciprocity, and without becoming a pawn in a larger strategic game. Furthermore, if the 
FSM or any of the FAS should choose a different partner nation for mutual economic and 
security benefits, the results of this research could offer a set of best practices to ensure 
that interdependence does not erode sovereignty. 
D. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESES 
A complete evaluation of the U.S.–FSM Compact of Free Association must first 
address the reasons for free association as a political strategy, then examine how it has 
been applied in greater Micronesia and what changes might specifically benefit the FSM. 
1. Explanations for the Perceived Value of Free Association 
The general hypothesis examined in Chapter 3 concerns the reason that small 
island nations with structural constraints similar to those in the FSM choose to remain in 
free association. Political free association provides a kind of metastable equilibrium, a 
state (as in physics) in which small disturbances do not bring the system crashing 
down.16 The resulting conditions allow for modest growth through interdependence in an 
otherwise unsustainable MIRAB economic model, while preserving the necessary aspects 
of sovereignty for participation in the international system. In the context of international 
relations theory, both realism and liberalism presume that autonomous states are the 
principal actors.17 Though the anarchic nature of the international system might 
recommend independence and alliances to neorealists, or institutionalized 
interdependence to neoliberals, state sovereignty is a prerequisite for both. Formalized 
interdependence agreements like the COFA provide an avenue for both approaches. Free 
                                                 
16 Oxford English Dictionary, s.v. “Metastable.” Here used to indicate that small economic shocks are 
not likely to affect the overall positive growth trajectory subsidized by association with a larger state. 
17 Stephen M. Walt, “International Relations: One World, Many Theories,” Foreign Policy 110 
(Spring 1998): 31–32. 
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association satisfies a realist’s need for outside support to ensure survival if self-reliance 
is not possible, and a liberal’s desire for small states and large states to have equal 
standing in international law.  
2. Factors that Reinforce FSM Sovereignty 
Compact Title I provides for full Micronesian sovereignty and authority in 
internal and international affairs, as well as free migration by citizens of the FSM to the 
United States and its territories without any reciprocal right for U.S. citizens. This 
provision allows a relief of population pressure on the FSM infrastructure and ecosystem, 
while allowing a large stream of taxable remittances to family members at home. Title I 
supports two of the elements of the MIRAB economy,18 in which Migration, 
Remittances, Aid, and Bureaucracy define the principal factors of economic activity.19 
Compact migrants have the right to join the U.S. military and become U.S. citizens, 
though the FSM does not recognize dual U.S.–FSM citizenship. The U.S federal 
government compensates states and territories that provide subsidies to Compact 
migrants, effectively shouldering nearly the full burden of treaty externalities with no 
compensation expected or requested from the FSM. 
Compact Title IV also reinforces sovereignty by allowing either party 
individually, or both parties jointly to terminate the Compact. Despite the clear U.S. 
interest in maintaining exclusive military use of FSM territory, the FSM has legal and 
enforceable (through the Compact’s inclusion in U.S. law) means to opt out of the entire 
agreement through a plebiscite.20 
3. Factors that Undermine FSM Sovereignty 
Title II aid requires extensive government oversight, leading to a de facto loss of 
economic sovereignty from the FSM government to JEMCO, the Joint Economic 
Management Committee of three U.S. officials and two FSM officials. Furthermore, the 
                                                 
18 Bertram and Watters, “MIRAB Economy in South Pacific Microstates,” 497. 
19 Ibid. 
20 U.S.–FSM Compact of Free Association, Title IV, Art. IV, Sec. 443. 
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perception of a loss of sovereignty to the United States as a consequence of receiving 
Title II assistance has caused popular resentment and government initiatives to dissolve 
the Compact.21 
Title II also appears to drive “strategic aid,” a concept similar to the “checkbook 
diplomacy” allegedly pursued by some East Asian powers.22 Strategic aid is organized 
for the benefit of the donor, not the recipient, due to concerns regarding visibility and 
frequency. FSM government officials have little choice but to seek and accept this type of 
aid and accept the implications for reciprocity. Strategic aid is relatively uncoordinated, 
compared to international disaster relief aid; as a result, development occurs unevenly if 
at all, and the sustained economic impact of such projects may require further 
maintenance or investment by the FSM that it cannot support. 
4. Provisions that Could Reinforce FSM Sovereignty if Modified 
The 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea granted each coastal nation an 
Exclusive Economic Zone extending 200 nautical miles from its territorial waters. As a 
result of UNCLOS, the Micronesian nations have gained huge EEZs to potentially 
enforce for economic benefit. The FSM EEZ, 18th largest in the world, has potential for 
natural resource development (e.g., as a migratory tuna fishery); however, successful 
integration of the EEZ for economic growth depends on enforcement capacity, which the 
FSM currently does not have and is not likely to have without a huge financial burden. 
Properly delivered assistance could support FSM sovereignty. 
E. RESEARCH DESIGN 
A thorough answer to the larger question should include a theoretical approach: 
an investigation into the concept of sovereignty, and its relationship to self-sufficiency 
and self-determination. In the first part of the thesis, scholarly interpretations of 
sovereignty will be assessed alongside United Nations literature regarding self-
determination, in particular against the backdrop of Pacific decolonization. This section 
                                                 
21 FSM Congress, C.R. No. 19–155; C.R. No. 16–89. 
22 Andre Vltchek, “Wooing the Islands,” Foreign Policy in Focus (January 15, 2008), http://www.ips-
dc.org. 
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of the research will also identify the political and economic capacity gaps faced by the 
Micronesian government and the reasons for the FSM’s continued affiliation with the 
U.S. Analysis of the potential benefits of continued free association will provide the 
background for the second part, which explores what the FSM might have to give up in 
pursuit of these benefits. 
To be of use in policy-making and planning, a discussion of theory should be 
followed with a practical analysis: in this case, a qualitative cost-benefit analysis of the 
U.S.–FSM COFA with regard to sovereignty. 
Both of these methodologies aim to provide the groundwork for future Compact 
adjustments, with the goal of preserving FSM sovereignty, fostering sustainable 
economic development, and maintaining the security interests of both parties as 
independent or interdependent nations. The third part will examine how the FSM and the 
United States could balance the existing free association treaty for mutual benefit. This 
analysis will use the theoretical goals of free association from the first part and the 
qualitative metrics from the second to propose structural changes that could positively 
affect Micronesian sovereignty. These proposed changes will also be assessed in terms of 
stated U.S. interests, as the relationship is intended to be mutually beneficial. 
F. THESIS OVERVIEW AND CHAPTER OUTLINE 
Chapter I, the introduction, explains the current U.S.–FSM relationship under the 
Compact of Free Association, and provides the research question and its significance. 
Chapter II provides historical perspectives on the Trust Territory and 
decolonization efforts, summarizes the concept of sovereignty, and explores the 
implications of free association as an internationally recognized status. This chapter 
examines shared governance agreements and provides an assessment of common 
misunderstandings concerning free association, with the aim of establishing the FSM as a 
sovereign, independent state in practice as well as in theory. 
Chapter III examines the U.S.–FSM COFA relationship in terms of modern 
requirements for viable statehood, as opposed to the original exigencies of post-Cold War 
 11 
power politics. In particular, the research identifies the internal demands of the island 
economy as well as the external demands of the international economy—including 
participation in the UN system—that the FSM is currently unable to meet on its own. 
Chapter IV consists of a qualitative cost-benefit analysis of COFA provisions 
with regard to the different dimensions of sovereignty.  
Chapter V identifies structural changes to the COFA that could better preserve 
FSM sovereignty and economic interests alongside U.S. involvement in the region.  
Chapter VI concludes with a revised understanding of free association, based on 
the results of this research, as a model for preservation of sovereignty by small states 
wishing to join a political symbiosis. 
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II. IS FREE ASSOCIATION COMPATIBLE WITH 
SOVEREIGNTY? 
The research question asks how a freely associated state can maintain its 
sovereignty. Before answering that question—how—the underlying assumption must be 
addressed. Is free association a sharing of sovereign authority and capacity with the aim 
of strengthening a state, or is it a de facto and potentially irreversible relinquishment of 
sovereign status? 
This chapter first briefly describes the FSM’s political trajectory in the post-
World War II era, with focus on the preconditions that led to the acceptance of associated 
statehood—generally understood as a compromise between independence and 
integration. Next, this chapter examines the concept of sovereignty and whether it is an 
absolute attribute or one that may itself involve compromise. Last, a review of the 
common arguments surrounding sovereign status shows that certain states, including the 
FSM, may suspend the exercise of their sovereignty so long as they possess the 
international legal standing to do so in a temporary manner. 
A. FROM TRUST TERRITORY TO ASSOCIATED STATE 
Analysis of sovereignty in the FSM is complicated somewhat by the fact that the 
islands have been politically entangled with the United States since the end of World War 
II, when American forces liberated the Caroline Islands from Japan—itself an 
administrator of a previous League of Nations mandate in Micronesia. After the war, the 
Carolines—along with the Marshalls and the Marianas—became part of the U.S.-
administered UN Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, a political construct with the 
mission of progressively reducing their dependence on former colonial powers.23 This 
section examines some of the literature concerning postwar economic and security 
conditions and how these affected the political decisions of the Micronesian people and 
their leaders. 
                                                 
23 Edward C. Camacho, “Emerging Micronesian Island Nations: Challenges for United States Policy” 
(master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 1995), http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA302960.69. 
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1. Cultural and Historical Background 
A thorough and perceptive review of greater Micronesian history and culture is 
provided in Edward C. Camacho’s Naval Postgraduate School thesis, “Emerging 
Micronesian Island Nations: Challenges for United States Policy.” The personal 
perspective of a Micronesian native and U.S. Army officer contributes to this 
comprehensive review of the political and cultural forces that have shaped modern 
Micronesia. Camacho’s 1995 work suggests that the region remains strategically 
important to the United States even after the end of the Cold War, and that further U.S. 
financial aid is warranted lest East Asian powers draw the islands into their orbit.24 
Though the cultural context provided by Camacho’s thesis is valuable in defining the 
problem set, his conclusions promote fear of an “Asian-controlled Micronesia,”25 a 
meme that is repeated throughout the post-Cold War literature and tends to obscure 
correct understanding of the COFA. Additionally, he suggests the precedence of U.S. 
constitutional norms over the Constitutions of the ROP, the RMI, and the FSM despite 
the fact that the COFA itself is a treaty between recognized sovereign states in addition to 
being integrated into U.S. Code.  
An equally exhaustive and no less critical approach is found in Gonzaga Puas’s 
doctoral dissertation for the Australian National University. Puas, a native of Lekinioch 
atoll in Chuuk state, examines the history of Micronesian agency under a succession of 
colonial and semi-colonial regimes. His detailed narrative describes how Micronesians 
have adapted to declared colonization under Spain and Germany, Japanese administration 
of the League of Nations mandate, and U.S. administration of the Trust Territory. In 
examining the interplay between traditional and modern economic activity, Puas 
identifies a “new global model of the extended family system”26 that has allowed 
Micronesians to maintain their cultural identity while traveling to and benefiting from 
                                                 
24 Camacho, “Emerging Micronesian Island Nations,” 158. 
25 Ibid., 147. 
26 Gonzaga Puas, “The Federated States of Micronesia’s Engagement with the Outside World: 
Control, Self-Preservation, and Continuity,” (doctoral dissertation, Australian National University, 2016), 
248. 
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more developed nations. This model resembles the MIRAB (Migration, Remittances, 
Aid, and Bureaucracy) economic pattern, which will be discussed in Chapter III. 
Arguably the best social and cultural context for the issues raised in this research 
comes from a Jesuit priest, not a native-born Micronesian. Francis X. Hezel, SJ has 
published Micronesian Seminar, a perspective on Micronesian affairs spanning the last 
fifty years; though he arrived in Micronesia in 1963 as an outsider, his articles concerning 
social, political, and economic development consistently put local interests first while 
advocating for a constructive interaction with foreign powers. Hezel’s analysis of the 
health of the COFA relationship since its inception shows a paradoxical improvement in 
many official measures of development, along with a decline in prospects for self-
sufficiency.27 He also believes the MIRAB economy is misunderstood as a failure of 
economic growth, rather than posed as the most sustainable pattern under the current 
conditions. He asks the important question: “What if, in fact, the islands simply cannot be 
self-sufficient unless they revert back to pre-contact ways?”28 The logical conclusion, if 
Hezel’s hypothesis is correct, is that Micronesia’s future must be an interdependent one. 
Nonetheless, stabilizing this interdependence through free association is just one option 
available to the FSM. 
2. United Nations Decolonization Efforts 
The United Nations has long been a driving force for decolonization and 
subsequent restoration of political autonomy. According to General Assembly Resolution 
1514 (1960); “inadequacy of political, economic, social, or educational preparedness 
should never serve as a pretext for delaying independence.”29 From the perspective of 
former colonies, a rapid move toward independence could be problematic, especially if 
the colonial period degraded or destroyed traditional economic patterns that supported 
self-sufficiency. These countries must assess the benefits of self-government along with 
                                                 
27 Francis X. Hezel, “Is That the Best You Can Do? A Tale of Two Micronesian Economies,” 
Micronesia Seminar online, 2006, accessed 8 May, 2017, www.micsem.org. 
28 Ibid. 
29 UN General Assembly, Resolution 1514 (XV), Declaration on the Granting of Independence to 
Colonial Countries and Peoples, 14 December, 1960, http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp? 
symbol=A/RES/1514(XV). 
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the long-term costs of maintaining full political independence, since an unsustainable 
plan may lead back into dependency and a loss of autonomy. UN General Assembly 
Resolution 1541 provides at least three possible options for a people to exercise their 
right of self-determination: “emergence as a sovereign independent state, free association 
with an independent state, or integration with an independent state.”30 Independence is 
therefore understood to be one option among many—the preferred option for advocates 
of rapid decolonization, but perhaps not an immediately sustainable one for peoples 
emerging from a more exploitative colonialism. 
The UN Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, which lasted from 1947 until 1986, 
was only the latest political construct in which Micronesians were not entitled to self-
government. Armstrong and Hills’s 1984 review of Micronesian legal issues notes that 
“from the beginning, the Trust Territory also enjoyed a unique status because its 
sovereignty was reserved in political trust while the foundation for development was 
laid.”31 To responsibly administer the Trust Territory and meet its obligations under 
international law to build Micronesian capacity for governance, the United States had to 
ensure the islands would not fall under foreign occupation upon declared independence, 
as they lacked military forces of their own. The post-World War II situation in the Pacific 
led to the TTPI becoming a “strategic trust,” and paradoxically slowed Micronesia’s 
movement toward self-determination.32 The emergence of free association as a political 
strategy finally provided a way for Micronesian islands to participate as sovereign states 
in the international system without the need to be fully self-sufficient.  
3. Origin of the Compacts of Free Association 
Negotiations concerning the political status of the Trust Territory proto-states set 
Micronesian sovereignty interests against U.S. strategic interests. In 1970, more than a 
decade before the COFA, leaders across greater Micronesia insisted on recognized legal 
sovereignty even as they acknowledged the need and desire to remain in close association 
                                                 
30 UN General Assembly, Resolution 1514 (XV). 
31 Arthur John Armstrong and Howard Loomis Hills. “The Negotiations for the Future Status of 
Micronesia,” The American Journal of International Law 78, no. 2 (1984): 497. 
32 Camacho, “Emerging Micronesian Island Nations,” 54. 
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with the United States. Donald F. McHenry’s book “Micronesia: Trust Betrayed” 
chronicles the evolution of free association and provides a critical look at U.S. attempts to 
retain as much control as possible in the Pacific due to perceived Cold War threats. The 
greatest sticking point for the Micronesian side was the issue of termination; the exercise 
of sovereignty would have limited meaning if it was to be constrained by a U.S. veto over 
Micronesian interests.33 Despite legal language asserting rights to unilateral termination, 
the idea of a de facto U.S. veto in the FSM’s affairs remains at the heart of a small but 
vocal anti-free association movement today. 
When the TTPI finally split into independent, sovereign nations in 1979, the 
United States designed a system for what would become the Freely Associated States to 
maintain political and economic ties with their former trustee state. The resulting 
Compact of Free Association, signed in 1986, was designed to bolster American as well 
as Micronesian interests. Specifically, the COFA gave the U.S. military the exclusive 
right to operate in the territory of the ROP, FSM, and RMI; in return the United States 
would provide defense, financial aid, government services, and unrestricted migration for 
Micronesians. Though both parties signed a “Compact II” in 2003, this was substantially 
similar to the 1986 agreement; Chapter IV examines Compact II in detail. 
B. SOVEREIGNTY IN THEORY AND IN PRACTICE 
Understanding how the COFA relationship affects Micronesian sovereignty first 
requires a thorough definition of sovereignty itself. The concept of sovereignty comprises 
a basic definition, two recognized theoretical forms or regimes, and at least four 
functional types or areas in which sovereignty may be exercised. 
1. Definition of Sovereignty 
What is sovereignty, and why does it matter? As it is defined in the Oxford 
English Dictionary—“the authority of a state to govern itself or another state”34 
sovereignty describes an authority without necessarily the capacity or competence for 
                                                 
33 Donald F. McHenry, Micronesia: Trust Betrayed (New York: Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace, 1975), 98. 
34 Oxford English Dictionary, s.v. “Sovereignty.” 
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governance. Who should recognize that authority, and what form should governance 
take? Furthermore, what capacity must an authority maintain in order to be recognized? 
James Crawford’s book The Creation of States in International Law furthers the 
understanding of sovereignty as a functional attribute rather than a legal status. He writes: 
In its most common modern usage, sovereignty is the term for the ‘totality 
of international rights and duties recognized by international law’ as 
residing in an independent territorial unit—the state. It is not itself a right, 
nor is it a criterion for statehood. It is a somewhat unhelpful, but firmly 
established, description of statehood; a brief term for the state’s attribute 
of more-or-less plenary competence.35 
This necessarily complex definition underlies all further discussions of 
sovereignty in this thesis: from Robert Jackson’s negative and positive sovereignty 
regimes, to Stephen Krasner’s sub-types of sovereignty, to the very reasons why the 
assertion of sovereignty in associated states does not always bear out in practice. 
Sovereignty encompasses rights as well as duties, authority as well as capacity—and a 
myriad of other concepts including self-governance, self-determination, and 
independence. A further examination of these concepts will help answer the research 
question in terms of what attributes of sovereignty a freely associated state should be able 
to maintain, irrespective of its status under international law.  
2. Recognized Forms of Sovereignty 
Robert H. Jackson’s book Quasi-states: Sovereignty, International Relations, and 
the Third World is an extensive overview of how the concepts of negative and positive 
sovereignty have shaped states emerging from colonialism. Jackson links these forms of 
sovereignty to the similar concepts of negative and positive liberty: that which 
governments protect, and that which governments provide.36 While the newly created 
states in greater Micronesia possessed legal sovereignty, they did not have pre-existing 
political structures with the capacity to unify each island chain. Once recognized by other 
                                                 
35 James Crawford, The Creation of States in International Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979), 26–
27. 
36 Robert H. Jackson, Quasi-states: Sovereignty, International Relations, and the Third World 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 26–27. 
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nations, they achieved negative sovereignty (authority) well before realizing the positive 
sovereignty (capacity) that often preceded recognition in Europe and Asia. This idea of 
possible contrasts between authority and capacity is a consistent theme in the literature, 
especially with regard to recently decolonized states and peoples. As James Crawford 
says of these new states in his article “Islands as Sovereign Nations,” “the reality of their 
situation has to be set against their formal status and rights.”37 Further analysis by 
political scientists has sought to define what these rights are, and what types of capacity 
ought to accompany them if a state is to be considered fully sovereign. 
3. Functional Types of Sovereignty 
In his book Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy, Stephen Krasner identifies four 
discrete types of sovereignty: domestic, interdependence, international legal, and 
Westphalian.38 Domestic sovereignty concerns the internal exercise of political 
authority,39 while Westphalian sovereignty is based on “territoriality and the exclusion of 
external actors.”40 Interdependence sovereignty is most related to effective participation 
in the international economy,41 and international legal sovereignty involves recognition 
by the international community.42 Krasner’s typology will form the basis for assessment 
of the COFA with respect to sovereignty. In its political relationship with the United 
States, the FSM must occasionally yield specific aspects of its sovereignty, while gaining 
others that it might not otherwise have; the cost-benefit analysis will attempt to identify 
successful trade-offs and point out aspects of sovereignty that are being needlessly 
compromised. 
                                                 
37 James Crawford, “Islands as Sovereign Nations,” The International and Comparative Law 
Quarterly 38, no. 2 (1989): 298. 
38 Krasner, Sovereignty, 40. 
39 Ibid., 11. 
40 Ibid., 20. 
41 Ibid., 12. 
42 Ibid., 14. 
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C. CAN FREE ASSOCIATION PRESERVE SOVEREIGNTY? 
Before analyzing the COFA with respect to sovereignty, it would be prudent to 
determine if sovereignty is possible at all under a free association treaty, let alone if it is 
something that can be preserved or maintained. Is sovereignty a binary attribute? If so, 
the government of the FSM and likewise its neighbor states need not be concerned as to 
the wording of the COFAs, as the international community has already recognized their 
sovereign status. Furthermore, neither a lack of state capacity nor a treaty permitting 
significant U.S. intrusion could reverse the achievement of this status. Yet legal status 
alone does not even approach Crawford’s notion of a state’s “plenary competence.”43 
Sovereign authority without sovereign capacity may become problematic for a state, 
especially if such lack of capacity means allowing a “partner” state to pursue its interests 
within one’s own territory. 
Upon its independence from trusteeship in 1986, the Federated States of 
Micronesia formalized two types of sovereignty best understood through Krasner’s 
framework—Westphalian and international legal—in the face of significant gaps in state 
capacity caused by geographic isolation, colonialism, and war. On the same date, the 
FSM government also relinquished a significant portion of its newly acquired 
Westphalian sovereignty to the United States, through entry into force of the Compact of 
Free Association. The only aspect of the FSM’s sovereignty that has remained intact is 
international legal sovereignty, which in Krasner’s definition is “the necessary condition 
for rulers to compromise voluntarily aspects of their Westphalian sovereignty.”44 The 
key word here is voluntarily; in terms of entry into and exit from treaties, it turns out that 
international legal sovereignty matters a great deal. 
Free association, as understood in the UN resolutions concerning decolonization, 
represents a significant decrease in sovereign authority compared with independent 
statehood. The FSM is not a true associated state by the UN definition, which includes 
the Cook Islands, Niue, and the former status of both the Philippines and Puerto Rico. 
                                                 
43 Crawford, Creation of States in International Law, 26–27. 
44 Krasner, Sovereignty, 19. 
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Rather, the FSM is an independent, sovereign state under a free association treaty, which 
limits Micronesian sovereignty in much the same way that any treaty between unequal 
powers might limit the lesser power. 
The distinction is critical because the FSM’s international legal standing ensures 
that termination is not only possible under the self-determination pathways endorsed by 
the UN, but a legally enforceable way to withdraw from a treaty—in this case the 
COFA—should it cease to benefit Micronesian interests. Furthermore, the FSM has 
several options short of termination in case of U.S. non-performance of treaty 
obligations. These are options that it would never realistically have under a regime 
similar to that in the Cook Islands or Niue, also termed “free association.” A correct 
understanding of the FSM’s international legal status, though no longer under formal 
dispute, is a prerequisite for any U.S. or Micronesian efforts to change the COFA or the 
way it is administered. 
1. Overview of Shared Governance Regimes 
Governance delegation and other forms of shared sovereignty take a wide variety 
of political forms. Among these are federalism, territory or commonwealth status, 
suzerainty, several regimes of formal protection, and free association. Only one form 
outside of full integration or independence—free association—meets UN criteria for self-
determination, as it recognizes a nation’s legal capacity to enter into and withdraw from 
associated statehood. The FSM shares a very specific form of formalized interdependence 
with the United States—one that most accurately fits the definition of free association as 
spelled out in UNGA Resolution 1541, but paradoxically also respects its full sovereign 
independence. Though the options recognized by the UN may be inadequate in 
explaining the FSM’s current status, they are worth reviewing. 
2. Three Options for Self-determination 
The UN proposes three pathways for “non-self-governing territories” in General 




A Non-Self-Governing Territory can be said to have reached a full 
measure of self-government by: 
(a) Emergence as a sovereign independent State; 
(b) Free association with an independent State; or 
(c) Integration with an independent State 
Principle VII 
(a) Free association should be the result of a free and voluntary choice by 
the peoples of the territory concerned expressed through informed and 
democratic processes. It should be one which respects the individuality 
and the cultural characteristics of the territory and its peoples, and retains 
for the peoples of the territory which is associated with an independent 
State the freedom to modify the status of that territory through the 
expression of their will by democratic means and through constitutional 
processes. 
(b) The associated territory should have the right to determine its internal 
constitution without outside interference, in accordance with due 
constitutional process and the freely expressed wishes of the people. This 
does not preclude consultations as appropriate or necessary under the 
terms of the free association agreed upon.45 
Principle VI(b) appears to differentiate between sovereignty and independence, 
and deserves further scrutiny. There are essentially two ways to interpret the language. In 
one understanding, though free association is contrasted with full sovereignty, the 
expectation today is that most forms of sovereignty can be maintained in free association 
except those particular elements delegated to a partner state; there is a distinction without 
much of a difference. Alternatively, associated statehood is intended to be something 
short of full sovereignty—a way to make suzerain states, protectorates, and dependencies 
feel better about their status without altering the fact of control by a larger state.  
If the latter is the understanding adopted by future generations of Micronesians, 
the citizens of the FSM may elect to terminate such a relationship irrespective of 
empirical evidence concerning its benefits. Some clarity regarding the alternatives might 
                                                 
45 UN General Assembly, Resolution 1514 (XV). 
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help satisfy concerns that the COFA allows sovereignty in name only. A closer 
examination of the five state relationships termed “free association” reveals small 
differences in the way this association is implemented that make a great deal of 
difference as to their international legal status. 
3. Contemporary States in Free Association 
a. The FSM, RMI, and ROP 
Though the other Freely Associated States of Palau and the Marshall Islands also 
lacked sovereignty under the Trust Territory administration and made similar treaties, the 
FSM adopted its Constitution as well as the COFA first, under a process that was not 
complicated by either nuclear materials exclusion laws (as in Palau) or reparations for 
nuclear test damage (as in the Marshalls). Even this relatively straightforward adoption of 
a new form of shared sovereignty was significantly contested in the international 
community, primarily due to disagreement over the U.S.’s obligations concerning the 
disestablishment of the UN Trust Territory. 
The theory and concept of free association was first defined in the Hilo Principles 
of 1978, while the COFA itself detailed the practical application of these principles.46 
The COFA treaties as originally signed recognized the new Micronesian states as fully 
sovereign nations, with the right to conduct their own internal affairs and international 
relations subject to certain pre-arranged limitations. This recognition of sovereignty, 
especially with regard to international relations, distinguishes the U.S.–FSM relationship 
from suzerainty, in which a more powerful state recognizes a vassal state’s internal 
authority but manages its foreign affairs and defense.47  
b. The Cook Islands and Niue 
Though the Cook Islands and Niue have a relationship with New Zealand that is 
termed “free association,” New Zealand maintains responsibility for foreign affairs at the 
request of its partner states—a sort of voluntary suzerainty, with no provision for 
                                                 
46 Armstrong and Hills, “Negotiations for the Future Status of Micronesia,” 485. 
47 Merriam-Webster Online, s.v. “Suzerainty,” http://merriam-webster.com. 
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unilateral termination by the junior partner.48 In these islands, which share a head of state 
(the Queen of England) with their larger partner, the constitutional change required to 
assert full sovereignty would also free New Zealand from its obligations to maintain 
support. The smaller states remain free to exercise their right to self-determination, but 
that is an ideational goal and not a formal legal process; the difference may mean years of 
negotiations with New Zealand even if popular support is high. Furthermore, Niueans and 
Cook Islanders hold New Zealand citizenship—arguably a higher incentive for the 
islands to remain in free association than development aid or defense.49 
4. Arguments Concerning Sovereign Status 
The Micronesian Constitution affirms the nation’s “inherent sovereignty,” and 
President Reagan confirmed it as the United States’ official position.50 Yet the early 
years after formal independence saw some disagreement as to whether these statements 
were meaningful in the context of the COFA. Though the FSM’s exercise of some degree 
of self-government is not in dispute, not all scholars agree that such a declaration by itself 
determines sovereignty.51 Stewart Firth of the Australian National University views free 
association as “semi-autonomy”52 regardless of the positions of both partner 
governments; he believes the United States’ role in designing the FSM Constitution 
makes true sovereignty impossible under the current laws.53  
Opposing this view, Edward Michal at the University of Hawaii asserts that the 
signing of the FSM’s constitution before any formal treaty agreement with the U.S. 
removes the claim of constitutional interference suggested by Firth and earlier by 
                                                 
48 Stewart Firth, “Political Status and Development: The Implications for Australian Foreign Policy 
Towards the Pacific Islands,” (ANU College of Asia & the Pacific, School of International, Political and 
Strategic Studies; State, Society and Governance in Melanesia Program, 2013), 5. 
49 Firth, “Australian Foreign Policy Towards the Pacific Islands,” 5. 
50 Preamble, Constitution of the Federated States of Micronesia; Stewart Firth, “Sovereignty and 
Independence in the Contemporary Pacific,” The Contemporary Pacific 1, no. 1–2 (1989): 80. 
51 Firth, “Sovereignty and Independence,” 80. 
52 Ibid., 75. 
53 Ibid. 
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international relations scholar Alan James.54 The COFA does not establish self-
government in the FSM as a result of self-determination; it merely recognizes it as a 
prerequisite condition for the validity of the treaty.55 Michal’s argument for Micronesian 
sovereignty is powerful in that he correctly identifies the COFA as a treaty, rather than as 
a constitutional establishment of joint governance as in New Zealand’s associated states; 
though a treaty may functionally limit the exercise of sovereignty, it would do so for 
large nations as well as small ones. Michal concludes: “The inability to terminate treaties 
unilaterally thereby would deprive all parties to such agreements of sovereignty—a 
reductio ad absurdum demonstrating the argument’s fallacy.”56 Though Michal also 
observes that the former Trust Territory states are independent, like any other state they 
must still observe the treaty obligations unless exercising a specific right to terminate the 
relationship.57 
Regardless of this difference of opinion, which began even before entry into force 
of the COFA in 1986, the international community has recognized the FSM and its 
neighbors as sovereign, independent states. Over thirty years and a 2003 revision to the 
COFA have reinforced the compatibility of free association by treaty and international 
legal sovereignty. This norm has been reinforced not just by international law but by 
domestic U.S. law, which now recognizes 
that the people of the Federated States of Micronesia have and retain their 
sovereignty and their sovereign right to self-determination and the 
inherent right to adopt and amend their own Constitution and form of 
government and that the approval of the entry of the Government of the 
Federated States of Micronesia into the Compact by the people of the 
Federated States of Micronesia constituted an exercise of their sovereign 
right to self-determination.58 
                                                 
54 Edward J. Michal, “Protected States: The Political Status of the Federated States of Micronesia and 
the Republic of the Marshall Islands,” The Contemporary Pacific 5, no. 2 (Fall 1993), 312–313. 
55 Michal, “Protected States,” 317. 
56 Ibid., 314. 
57 Ibid., 305. 
58 U.S.–FSM Compact of Free Association, Preamble. 
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This recognition by the more powerful partner state provides the only protection 
that the FSM needs to essentially outsource its sovereign duties. When the direct 
economic aid provisions of the COFA expire in 2023, the FSM will still be responsible 
for its treaty obligations—just as the United States maintained its defense responsibility 
after the end of the Cold War.  
5. A Revised Definition and its Implications 
Of all the definitions put forth by scholars and UN officials, Hurst Hannum’s 
definition of a protected independent state most closely approximates the political status 
of the FSM. Such a state “has delegated certain of its powers by treaty to a protecting or 
guardian state, but it retains full domestic autonomy and its general right of control over 
foreign relations, except insofar as that control has been delegated by specific treaty 
provisions.”59 Three specific implications arise from the above analysis and this updated 
definition: 
1. Free association as delineated in the COFA is a descriptor and not a 
qualifier of sovereign status. Michal’s argument is the most compelling: 
due to the chronological precedence of the FSM Constitution, coupled 
with the recognized authority of the FSM government to conduct foreign 
relations, the governance structure of the FSM and its neighbors does not 
resemble that of the Cook Islands and Niue.60 
2. International recognition and UN membership of the FSM and the other 
former Trust Territory states indicates that they are now fully sovereign, 
regardless of historical dispute concerning the origins of their constitutions 
and free association treaties. The COFA formally recognizes this status 
even as its provisions may intrude on the functional aspects of 
Micronesian sovereignty. 
3. Acquisition of international legal sovereignty by the FSM is irrevocable so 
long as it maintains the attributes of statehood; as a result, though 
Micronesians retain the right to self-determination and may choose to 
integrate with another independent state, no functional concession of 
sovereignty through the existing COFA can limit the FSM’s international 
legal standing. 
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Because the COFA is understood as a treaty, it represents the exercise of 
Micronesian sovereignty and is at most a temporary concession of sovereign rights, if at 
all. Hurst Hannum points out that “adherence to a treaty is not a limitation on 
sovereignty; it is rather one of the ultimate sovereign acts.”61 What can this sovereign act 
do for the FSM? Stephen Krasner offers this summary: “By facilitating accords, 
international legal sovereignty offers the possibility for rulers to secure external resources 
that can enhance their ability to stay in power and to promote the security, economic, and 
ideational interests of their constituents.”62 The next chapter will examine what these 
interests might be for the FSM in 2017, and what political and economic resources are 
currently lacking that the United States might provide. 
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III. POTENTIAL BENEFITS OF MICRONESIAN FREE 
ASSOCIATION 
The reasons for U.S. support and FSM acceptance of the initial Compact of Free 
Association are well-documented, and it seems that by 1986 the U.S. had successfully 
placed its strategic interests above the idea of unfettered Micronesian independence. Yet 
the security situation has since changed significantly since the start of COFA negotiations 
in 1981. The Cold War is over, and the FSM’s international legal standing is 
unchallenged—it arguably no longer needs the United States as a sponsor or as a 
protector. Furthermore, the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea provided the new 
nation with formal rights to territory and resources far beyond those available to Caroline 
Islanders in precolonial times. Considering the FSM’s evolving position, the signing of a 
revised “COFA II” in 2003 seems to be an unnecessary return to an unequal partnership.  
Still, even an unequal partnership may have benefits that outweigh the costs, as 
will be assessed in Chapter IV. This chapter identifies some of these potential benefits, 
and attempts to show that while COFA II may have been the result of political pressure, it 
was also based in a careful consideration of national interests and economic strategy. 
Discussion of benefits and costs first requires a desired end-state. What kind of nation 
does the FSM want to be, and is complete independence sufficient to serve this goal? Or 
is formal interdependence—protected statehood—required to support a modern economy 
dispersed across hundreds of miles of ocean? The answer requires an honest evaluation of 
the FSM’s ability to use its sovereign authority in support of its sovereign capacity: the 
ability to attain desired political and economic outcomes, whether on its own or in some 
form of free association. 
A. THE DEVELOPMENT ENVIRONMENT IN MICRONESIA 
The last chapter examined the most accurate definition of the FSM’s status: the 
protected state. A protected state does not give up its formal independence—Chapter II 
established the FSM’s international legal sovereignty and standing to compromise other 
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aspects of its sovereignty, with the aim of building a viable state.63 While this political 
status is not unique to islands, islands have certain limitations that may prevent effective 
local exercise of sovereign power. In considering political and economic strategy, leaders 
of island states must consider their governments’ functional capacity as well as their 
recognized authority, and may elect to join protective treaties that will shore up, rather 
than erode, their legitimacy.  
Challenges to viability and development faced by the former Trust Territory states 
fall generally into two categories: those resulting from the colonial legacy or the 
international system itself, and those that might be faced by any small islands. Many of 
these difficulties are common to most western Pacific island groups: wide geographic 
dispersal, a history of exploitation by colonial and semi-colonial powers, and traditions of 
subsistence agriculture and mariculture. Other conditions are specific to one state or 
another, such as environmental destruction from U.S. nuclear tests, which has specifically 
affected the low atolls of the Marshall Islands group and rendered some (e.g., Bikini, 
Enewetak) uninhabitable. For this analysis, the modern-day challenges faced by the FSM 
and its neighbors can most usefully be grouped into those particular to islands and those 
particular to small independent states. 
B. CHALLENGES PARTICULAR TO ISLANDS 
This section will examine the FSM’s particular problem set as a chain of small 
islands. Archipelagos present certain challenges to state development irrespective of 
political status. Their governments must overcome the limitations of dispersed geography 
and small populations in order to participate, let alone thrive, in the world economy and 
to ensure the welfare of their citizens. This requires a proactive and pragmatic approach, 
often including formalized interdependent relationships or sharing of sovereignty, as 
sufficient local resources may simply not be available. The principal areas in which 
islands may fall short are in domestic governance and economic development. 
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1. Domestic Governance 
The entanglement with the United States as Trust Territory administrator had the 
most problematic effect on governance in the FSM. The formation and 1979 
independence of the Federated States out of the island groups of the central Caroline 
Islands—Yap, Chuuk, Pohnpei, and Kosrae—resulted directly from the difficulty of 
governing dispersed islands from a single location. The U.S. Navy and later the U.S. 
federal government administered the entire Trust Territory from Saipan, but had no 
expectation that policies would be tailored to the individual cultural communities—
Chamorro, Yapese, etc.64 The existing institutions were those of a U.S. territorial 
government; as Howard Loomis Hills points out, this was not out of a desire to own or to 
rule Micronesia, but out of necessity to fulfill UN requirements for effective 
administration.65 Compounding the problem for Micronesians is the fact that, as John 
Connell asserts, U.S. administration–with the efficiency of its World War II-era supply 
system–“effectively destroyed” the subsistence economy and replaced it with a local 
bureaucracy dedicated to distributing aid.66 Thus the government and the economy are 
closely linked: the FSM’s greatest barrier to economic development—the bureaucracy—
is also a major part of its survival strategy. 
2. Economic Development 
The Micronesian population has not fared well under recent attempts to replace 
the post-colonial structure with a market economy. The U.S. Comptroller General 
delivered a 1983 report to Congress concerning economic development in greater 
Micronesia, which contains this assessment of economic challenges in the Caroline 
Islands: 
The economy is dependent upon the transfer of U.S. funds. Geographic, 
social, and public policy constraints—including the remoteness from 
world markets—limited domestic markets, the inadequate channeling of 
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savings into investments, complex land-tenure systems and other factors—
have and continue to limit the growth of the private-sector economy. As 
such, government budgets exceed the capabilities of the economies to 
support them and remain dependent on U.S. funds.67 
While the obvious solution to this problem from an outsider’s perspective would 
be to reduce U.S. funding and force the FSM government to live within its means, the 
reality is not so simple. Bertram (1986) points out that in some Pacific states, government 
spending directly supports the modern way of life as well as economic activity in the 
private sector—which is especially true considering the FSM’s large proportion of 
government employees relative to the population.68 The government is the “middle man” 
in aid distribution, but cutting out the middle man would also cut out the heart of the 
FSM economy. It seems that two solutions remain available: the near-overnight creation 
of a market economy based on exports, or the streamlining of government services so that 
aid efforts are not needlessly duplicated. Both of these solutions are unlikely without 
certain changes to the COFA that Chapter V will propose.  
C. CHALLENGES PARTICULAR TO SMALL, INDEPENDENT STATES 
The FSM, RMI, and ROP share these conditions, but so do Pacific dependent 
territories such as American Samoa and French Polynesia. A thorough assessment of the 
FSM’s position requires an analysis of challenges specific to small independent states, in 
addition to those faced by islands. A political and economic capacity gap exists in which 
small nations must generate capabilities out of proportion to their organic resources in 
order to thrive. The worldwide recognition of three of the former Trust Territory states, 
the end of the Cold War, and the adaptation of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea 
have widened this gap, and these factors are discussed in detail below. 
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1. The Financial Impact of Independence 
In theory, international legal sovereignty—once attained—should cost nothing, as 
it is the result of adherence to an international norm. In practice, sovereign status may 
come with significant costs in addition to those that support a viable economy and 
government. The institutions and relationships that newer and especially smaller states 
used to gain internal legitimacy and external recognition must be maintained as well.  
According to the 1936 Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of 
States, in addition to population, territory, and government, a state must maintain the 
“capacity to enter into relations with the other States.”69 A system of embassies and 
consulates, along with participation in UN institutions, is not legally mandatory but may 
be a practical imperative, especially if a state relies on foreign aid. With no numerical 
limit (besides “a permanent population”70) on the minimum size of states, the proportion 
of a state’s resources needed to support international relations can be very large; 
diplomatic capacity is not scalable below a certain level.  
Integration with a larger political entity benefits the entire bureaucracy, not just 
the diplomatic arm. As Geoff Bertram puts it, “non-sovereign jurisdictions are able to 
‘travel light’ in terms of the resources that have to be allocated to operating the public 
sector.”71 When deciding whether to pursue independence, even with the consent of the 
metropole, such non-sovereign jurisdictions need to consider the possible increase in 
financial overhead that they would soon face. Indeed, this decision must be primarily up 
to the smaller state, especially in an era when the larger power might fully support 
independence as an option. Former colonies should weigh all options carefully, lest they 
fall into a cycle of dependency. Help from abroad may be necessary, but could come 
from a different partner nation—an idea further explored in the concluding chapters. 
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Geoff Bertram concludes that sovereignty “operates as a tax on material welfare,” 
and island territories contemplating independence should take note of his explanation:  
Non-sovereign political status confers advantages in political economy 
terms because by being integrated with a larger, usually richer, economy, a 
small island community can secure more favorable treatment in terms of 
financial aid, migration access, other market access, and ability to leverage 
off some functions of large-country government services such as 
education and health.72 
Besides a lack of sovereignty, the above condition would be desirable; if free 
association could preserve sovereignty in the long term while ceding certain elements of 
sovereign authority in the short term, small island nations could enjoy the benefits 
Bertram lists without feeling the weight of a colonial regime.  
2. UNCLOS and the Exclusive Economic Zone 
Ronni Alexander’s historical analysis of the development environment finds that 
“while certainly colonization and economic enterprise did take place, particularly in the 
smaller islands it was more for the purpose of staking a claim to the ocean than for the 
sake of possession of the islands themselves.”73 This pattern persists across 
contemporary Micronesia, owing to developments in international law. The FSM has the 
unique distinction in the former Trust Territory of having become constitutionally 
independent before the signing of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. Not only 
did the extent of its territorial sea grow from 3 to 12 nautical miles, baselined to each 
separate atoll or high island, but it suddenly gained control of a huge Exclusive Economic 
Zone—the 18th largest in the world. This newly recognized right has led the FSM’s allies 
to refer to it as a “large ocean nation”74 rather than a small island nation. The recognition 
of an EEZ does not confer absolute territorial control, but does imply a significant boost 
to available marine resources and to the potential for economic growth.  
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While this large swath of ocean could produce huge resource revenues for the 
FSM—especially in migratory tuna—development of an indigenous fishing industry 
beyond nearshore waters never took off.75 Instead, the FSM sells fishing permits to a 
large fleet of East Asian long-liners. These are managed through NORMA, the National 
Ocean Resources Management Authority, which has enforcement authority but 
comparatively little organic enforcement capability; most enforcement is done by other 
states.76 Sovereign control of the EEZ also implies the right to not only regulate, but 
close the fisheries entirely in order to let stocks replenish. Neighboring Palau has opted to 
close a huge portion of its fishery in 2020, but has little prospect for effective 
enforcement, with a single large patrol boat assigned to the entire EEZ. 
James Crawford’s 1989 essay “Islands as Sovereign Nations” anticipated the 
difficulties small islands often face in benefiting from UNCLOS. He noted: “There are 
frequent stories of distant-water fishing fleets ignoring jurisdictional and resource 
boundaries in their search for fish. These enforcement problems can be severe even for 
developed and comparatively wealthy states: they may be wholly intractable for small 
developing island states.”77 Though the FSM has faced such difficulties since before 
independence and free association, the COFA itself may contain a solution: the United 
States’ treaty responsibility to defend the islands, broadly interpreted to include economic 
defense. This idea is further developed in Chapter V. 
3. Strategic Leverage and the End of the Cold War 
It should be apparent from the FSM’s geography that in addition to its potential 
for ocean resource development, the territorial sea and EEZ have strategic value as 
operating zones or areas of influence for foreign powers. Certainly the negotiations 
concerning the end of Trust Territory administration saw Micronesian interests often 
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subordinated to the political struggle between the United States and the Soviet Union, as 
briefly described in Chapter II. 
Perhaps out of necessity, some Pacific islanders used this struggle to build a 
survival strategy when they had nothing else to sell. Geoff Bertram states this rather 
cynically but correctly in his 1986 work on “‘Sustainable Development’ in Pacific Micro-
economies”: “Island governments need only mount occasional well-publicized flirtations 
with the USSR in order to reproduce their rent entitlement from period to period.”78 
Bertram’s skepticism of “Sustainable Development” (his own quotation marks) concerns 
some islands’ status as “rentier societies”79 centered on the interests of larger states 
seeking influence. His thesis resembles studies of the “resource curse” that occurs in 
countries with large reserves of natural resources. As in these other works, Bertram 
maintains that “it is not productive activity, but rent entitlements, which must be 
sustained and reproduced over time.”80 
The end of the Cold War might have ended this pattern, but Ronni Alexander’s 
1994 work on island development makes the following observation: “As long as there 
were two powers competing in the Pacific for influence…the Pacific Islands could play 
one side against the other, essentially commodifying that perception of their strategic 
importance.”81 Alexander is correct about strategic value as a commodity, though China 
has replaced the former Soviet Union as a principal buyer. The apparent Micronesian 
dissatisfaction with the current Compact of Free Association worries U.S. leaders, who 
readily react to diplomatic pressure suggesting that China is making a strategic move for 
influence in the Western Pacific. Though one common narrative concerns Micronesia’s 
strategic position in the “second island chain,”82 this is a U.S. description of a perceived 
PRC defensive perimeter, rather than a PRC description of a perceived U.S. offensive 
encirclement. Still, the huge swath of the North Pacific formally under Micronesian 
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control provides more than a valuable military operating area; food security for East Asia 
is increased by vast purse seine and long-line fleets fishing for migratory tuna in 
Micronesian waters. 
The norm of international legal sovereignty sustains the modern strategic 
influence game. No matter how small an island nation’s land area, each sovereign state 
has a vote at the United Nations, and the three Compact states have retained full 
autonomy in international relations. The PRC has frequently engaged in “checkbook 
diplomacy” with Pacific island nations, specifically by trading valuable economic 
assistance for recognition of its “One China” policy at the UN.83 Taiwan has done the 
same; official recognition for the Republic of China keeps a tenuous balance between 
island and mainland. So far, the Republic of Palau and the Republic of the Marshall 
Islands have recognized the ROC, while the Federated States of Micronesia—a previous 
ROC supporter—has switched its recognition to the PRC side. While this formality may 
not matter to most citizens of the FSM, the islanders run the risk of being caught in the 
middle of a competition for influence that does not respect their own interests. In 
particular, strategic foreign aid is by nature donor-driven and tends to prioritize visibility 
over effectiveness. 
It would be accurate to claim that PRC economic aid does much more than buy 
votes—it helps enormously with disaster relief, provides infrastructure to poor areas, and 
helps the FSM government pay its bills as it attempts to foster development. Still, not all 
infrastructure projects provide equal value; some Chinese aid is delivered along with 
Chinese or other guest workers, so Micronesians do not always gain employment 
opportunities. Furthermore, recent lease negotiations between the PRC’s Exhibition and 
Travel Group and the government of Yap State have highlighted a structural disadvantage 
for Micronesians; the pressure to lease land for high-dollar tourism is great, but 
Micronesian property laws are rooted in tribal custom, and do not guarantee democratic 
outcomes or even distribution of profits among traditional land users.84 Many of the 
issues surrounding tourism and land leases are not restricted to PRC public-private 
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ventures, but are inherent problems in any situation in which a larger and more populous 
country takes an interest in a smaller and less-developed one. 
D. MICRONESIAN STRATEGIES 
The FSM’s problems today center on a misunderstanding of “sustainability” in 
political economy. In much of the literature, sustainability is a goal understood to be the 
result of independent development, while the Micronesian economy has always been 
characterized by some degree of interdependence. Caroline Islanders were originally 
voyagers, like their distant neighbors in Polynesia, and inter-island relationships have 
supplemented subsistence patterns and sustained the culture since before the colonial 
period.85 The new ways are significantly less sustainable. Geoff Bertram summarizes the 
problem thus: “The colonial administrations long ago raised living standards in these 
micro-economies above the level which could be ‘sustained’ on the basis of local 
subsistence-sector production.”86 Perhaps the biggest challenge beyond that of pure 
survival is sustaining the Micronesian culture in the face of these modern economic 
pressures. The current strategy for the FSM is participation in formalized 
interdependence through the COFA. What might they gain from the relationship that 
sustains cultural values rather than supplanting them? The “extended family system”87 
may yet play a role here, albeit one that not all Micronesians believe to be beneficial in 
the long term. 
1. The MIRAB Economy: A Possible Long-term Solution? 
Bertram and Watters (1985) proposed a model of economic structure called 
MIRAB, consisting of Migration/Remittances, Aid, and Bureaucracy.88 MIRAB 
economies gain revenue through remittances from a large diaspora, while population 
pressures are relieved through migration. Foreign aid props up the remaining public 
sector-intensive economy. As a result of incoming aid, distributive bureaucracy draws a 
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large portion of the workforce into the well-paying public sector; this dynamic is well-
established throughout the former Trust Territory states. Though Gonzaga Puas actually 
argues that “the Compact does not fit the MIRAB model,”89 it is clear that he attaches a 
negative connotation to MIRAB, while other researchers recognize it as merely one of 
many different strategies for economic success given the structural limitations of 
dispersed island states. 
Bernard Poirine’s 1998 article “Should We Hate or Love MIRAB?” provides 
essential context and balanced analysis to the MIRAB model, suggesting that “by 
exporting labor and ‘geo-strategic services,’ small Pacific islands make the best use of the 
only comparative advantage they may have that allows them to gain from international 
trade.”90 Poirine’s approach to the MIRAB economy is a realistic appraisal of the 
potential for islands to join the greater international economy; in light of his work, this 
analysis will stop short of describing the FSM’s MIRAB economy as an evolutionary 
step, and evaluate sustainability based on a continuation of the existing model. 
2. Problems with a Reliance on the COFA 
In addition to foreign aid for strategic, disaster relief, or purely humanitarian 
purposes, the FSM receives funding from the United States as part of a treaty obligation. 
Direct U.S. aid in the Compact of Free Association is delivered through Title II 
allocations, while Title I provides U.S. government services through a short list of federal 
agencies, such as the FAA. The FSM has local offices to provide the same services, but 
these usually represent points of contact for funding rather than a true organic capability. 
The problem is one of incentives, and the principal incentive for fiscally responsible FSM 
government is the Compact Trust Fund. This is a fund designed to provide annual 
increases in revenue to supplement a proportional annual Title II aid decrease until 2023, 
at which point the government is on its own. While the intent of the Trust Fund has been 
clear since 2003, it is unclear what or who could motivate the government to accept limits 
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on its growth rather than attempt to secure additional funding from outside. It is critical 
for U.S. policymakers to understand that this is not necessarily the result of greed or 
incompetence, but might simply be a recognition of the current best prospect for survival. 
Francis X. Hezel argues that “Micronesia’s meal ticket is its rights, not its resources, and 
economic development has lately become a superfluity rather than the imperative it was 
always thought to be.”91 The FSM government’s incentive to continue to trade these 
rights for U.S. support is obvious. Breaking this cycle or making it more beneficial will 
fall to U.S. government policymakers in concert with the Micronesian people themselves, 
who will have the final say on whether the COFA continues in a third iteration. 
Before deciding on its future relationship with the U.S. or other partner nations, 
the FSM must first realistically address its own capacity to perform the duties of 
statehood that accompany its sovereign rights. The COFA was designed to ease the FSM 
and its neighbors out of dependence, but the bureaucracy—as the distributor of not only 
direct aid but also of lucrative government jobs—maintains an inertia of its own. In order 
for the FSM to be truly sovereign to the degree that it can choose its own course, it must 
come up with a system for delivering political goods to its citizens approximately equal 
to what the COFA currently provides. If this is not possible, free association or protected 
statehood may be the answer for the long term.  
E. SUSTAINING THE MICRONESIAN “MICROSTATE”92 
With its network of dispersed islands, small population, and special political 
relationship, the FSM can best be understood as a “microstate.”93 Zbigniew Dumieński 
offers the following definition of microstates: “Microstates are modern protected states, 
i.e. sovereign states that have been able to unilaterally depute certain attributes of 
sovereignty to larger powers in exchange for benign protection of their political and 
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economic viability against their geographic or demographic constraints.”94 This chapter 
has examined some of these constraints, as a basis for the idea that free association can 
allow more effective exercise of an island state’s sovereign authority in certain areas 
while limiting its formal authority in others. Such a trade-off is consistent with Krasner’s 
notion of “organized hypocrisy,” in which the authority of a sovereign state may exceed 
its capacity for governance.95 Bridging this gap may require formal concessions of 
sovereignty, but the potential benefits to economy, government, and society may 
outweigh the costs.  
The Micronesian state requires capacity to match its authority. Recognition and 
legal standing is necessary, but not sufficient, for viable statehood, and a responsible 
approach to state-building means considering practical realities as well as long-term 
ideological and cultural goals. The FSM has been irreversibly affected by colonialism 
and trusteeship on top of the islands’ preexisting geographic and demographic challenges. 
Protected statehood has its costs, but also enables a unique set of survival strategies for 
sustaining the economy, government, and society. Having laid out some of the FSM’s 
strategic problems, this paper will shift focus to current efforts to solve them through 
policy, namely the 2003 COFA II treaty. The next chapter will examine the current 
COFA in detail and attempt to identify the costs and benefits of each part. 
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IV.  QUALITATIVE COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS OF THE COFA 
This chapter will begin with a brief discussion of theory, describe the 
methodology for the cost-benefit analysis, and provide a chart and relevant commentary 
analyzing each of the four COFA titles. The results will support Chapter V’s 
recommendations to the citizens of the FSM. 
A. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
1. Revisiting Four Types of Sovereignty 
As explained in Chapter II, Stephen Krasner has categorized four discrete 
understandings of sovereignty: domestic, interdependence, international legal, and 
Westphalian. Domestic sovereignty concerns the internal exercise of political authority, 
and defines a political body’s capacity for governance.96 Interdependence sovereignty 
describes the conditions required for a state to benefit from the international economy, 
including the control of trade across borders.97 International legal sovereignty is the 
recognition of authority by the international community, and the reciprocal participation 
in the international system of laws and norms, to include institutions such as the United 
Nations.98 Westphalian sovereignty, closely related to domestic sovereignty, is based on 
“territoriality and the exclusion of external actors”; it represents that which sets one state 
apart from another.99 
This typology is useful in understanding the pressures felt by states in the 
international system. A state’s very existence may depend on determining the right mix 
of the various forms of sovereignty in order to advance its economic and social interests 
while maintaining security and stability. The pursuit of increased sovereignty may have 
adverse consequences, especially if the nation has a limited material capacity for 
governance. As Krasner puts it, “the exercise of one kind of sovereignty—for instance, 
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international legal sovereignty—can undermine another kind of sovereignty, such as 
Westphalian sovereignty, if the rulers of a state enter into an agreement that recognizes 
external authority structures.”100 Not all sovereignty concessions require formal 
agreements; for example, an increase in interdependence sovereignty through the pursuit 
of global trade relationships may erode Westphalian sovereignty if economic pursuits 
require the admission of powerful external actors, such as international corporations 
backed by foreign governments. 
Unlike international legal sovereignty and Westphalian sovereignty, which largely 
define a state’s authority, domestic sovereignty and interdependence sovereignty are 
linked to state capacity and control.101 A state must have effective control over its 
territory, and it must be able to benefit from economic activity that extends across its 
borders.102 Legal authority without sufficient capacity is especially problematic for 
dispersed island nations, and the parties to COFA II understood this well. While domestic 
and interdependence sovereignty may decrease due to a lack of government resources or 
an increase in uncontrolled economic flows, respectively, the COFA is generally 
designed to support these types of sovereignty. The operative question is whether their 
increase is offset by a loss of other attributes, such as Westphalian norms of non-
intervention. Do the sovereignty “costs” in one area outweigh the benefits in another? If 
so, a change in how the COFA is implemented may be necessary. 
2. Goal of the Analysis 
Though this research could assess the economic impacts of the COFA and attempt 
to quantify the effects of reduced sovereignty, this would provide an incomplete picture. 
Political and social impacts are not simply externalities, but factor directly into decisions 
about the FSM’s future. Even if the COFA is assessed to be financially profitable, a 
thorough analysis should also consider what else is gained or lost by allowing another 
state to intervene in Micronesian internal affairs. Most importantly, the research method 
                                                 




used here will lead to an effectively unbiased assessment of the Compact; should the 
FSM opt out of the agreement, its leaders can use the lessons of the U.S. COFA to inform 
their decisions with regard to independence or entry into a more beneficial relationship. 
B. METHODOLOGY 
Because this is a qualitative cost-benefit analysis, the methodology will be fairly 
simple. For each article of the COFA analyzed, three main questions will be addressed: 
• First, what benefit does the FSM ostensibly receive through the COFA? 
• Second, what is the cost to Micronesian sovereignty of receiving the 
benefit? 
• Third, does the sovereignty cost outweigh the material benefit by 
restricting the FSM’s ability to direct its future?  
The charts below show each article of the COFA along with its intent. They list 
the assessed economic, political, or social benefit to the FSM, along with a description 
of the cost to sovereignty. It is also possible that the effect of an article on sovereignty 
itself is positive. Accordingly, the analysis will describe the anticipated effects of each 
title on each of Krasner’s types of sovereignty: international legal, Westphalian, 
interdependence, and domestic. While the type with arguably the most staying power—
international legal sovereignty—is not likely to disappear in the FSM, this chapter will 
assume that it can be strengthened by the recognition of other states or eroded over time 
if a state fails to perform its responsibilities. 
Because this chapter involves the intentional compromise of sovereign attributes, 
some additional value judgements are necessary. The COFA is a legal contract as well as 
a bilateral treaty, and requires some attention to the fine print. For both levels of 
analysis—individual articles and entire titles—there are caveats or mitigating factors that 
may flip the cost-benefit calculus: 
• If the stated benefit to the FSM is redundant—an element of authority or 
capacity that it already possesses—the analysis may rest entirely on the 
sovereignty impact. For example, if U.S. recognition of Micronesian self-
government in Article I required the FSM to vote with the United States at 
the UN, the sovereignty impact would be entirely negative. Because it 
does not, Article I actually upholds the norm of international legal 
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sovereignty, and establishes that the larger state has an obligation to 
respect its smaller partner’s standing. 
• If the sovereignty cost of a specific article directly supports another part of 
the treaty, it may be justified by the benefit provided by that other part. 
For example, Article II recognizes the FSM’s authority and capacity to 
conduct foreign affairs, but requires consultation between governments in 
areas which impact the U.S. responsibility for defense. This sovereignty 
compromise is justified due to its limited scope: it directly supports Title 
III’s delegation of defense authority to the United States. 
The net assessment of the above factors is represented by an arrow: ↑ for a 
justifiable exchange of authority for capacity, → for no significant value gained or lost by 
the exchange, and ↓ for a reduction in sovereignty without added utility. An accounting 
of the positive or negative impacts to Krasner’s four types of sovereignty will follow each 
chart, followed by a summary of results. 
C. QUALITATIVE COSTS AND BENEFITS 
1. Title I 
Title I of the COFA, concerning governmental relations, is assessed in Table 1. 
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Table 1.   Cost-Benefit Analysis of COFA Title I 
Article Intent Benefit to the FSM Redundant? Sovereignty cost Justified? Net assessment 
Article I: Self-government 
Establishes bilateral 
nature of COFA, 
disestablishment of UN 
Trust Territory 
Formalizes U.S. 
recognition of FSM agency Yes None N/A ↑ 
Article II: Foreign Affairs 
Recognizes FSM foreign 
affairs authority and 
capacity 
Establishes legitimacy of 
COFA as a formal treaty 
Requires U.S. to support 




U.S. on foreign 
affairs required in 
light of Title III 
Yes ↑ 
Article III: Communications 
U.S. authority to operate 
telecommunications in 
order to fulfill COFA 
obligations 
None; currently a function 
of FSM government Yes None N/A → 
Article IV: Immigration 
Allows open FSM 
migration to U.S. and 
acceptance of 
employment without a 
visa 
Provides potential relief 
from overpopulation; 
allows migration and 
overseas labor to support 
home economy through 
remittances 
No 
FSM must accept 
U.S. immigration 




Article V: Representation 
Establishes that relations 
will be based on Vienna 
Convention on 
Diplomatic Relations 
Describes legal basis for 
diplomatic immunity of 
FSM government officials 
Yes None N/A → 
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Article Intent Benefit to the FSM Redundant? Sovereignty cost Justified? Net assessment 





Limits U.S. environmental 
impacts from COFA-
related projects; provides 
legal remedy for U.S. 
actions 
No 
Requires the FSM 






Article VII: General Legal 
Provisions 
Reinforces FSM citizen 
rights in U.S, mutual 
recognition of sovereign 
immunity 
Establishes process for tort 
claim settlement by U.S. 
agencies providing services 










a. Title I: International Legal Sovereignty 
Title I represents a net benefit to international legal sovereignty. While it could be 
argued that Micronesia is already legally sovereign and needs no further support, three 
articles in particular—I, II, and VII—enhance the FSM’s ability to conduct foreign 
relations. 
Article I and Article II together constitute the United States’ formal recognition of 
Micronesian self-government and sovereign authority. Article I recognizes the 
Micronesian constitution’s precedence over the COFA and permanently enshrines this 
recognition in U.S. Code. Article II requires the United States to support Micronesian 
membership in organizations such as the United Nations, but does not require the FSM to 
vote along with its treaty partner. 
Article VII recognizes the sovereign immunity of each nation, ensuring that the 
close relationship does not compromise the rights of politicians and officials working 
between the two nations. The language of Article VII concerning criminal jurisdiction 
has some implications for domestic sovereignty (see the following sections). 
b. Title I: Westphalian Sovereignty 
Title I limits Westphalian sovereignty in Article II, which requires the FSM to 
consult with the United States on foreign affairs if policy decisions might affect the U.S. 
defense authority and responsibility. Article II technically violates the concept of 
“exclusion of external actors”103 inherent in Westphalian sovereignty, so this 
compromise should be monitored carefully to ensure that it only serves Title III’s narrow 
aims concerning defense. In a way, the required consultation is designed to maintain the 
exclusion of all other actors. Despite the power imbalance inherent in protected 
statehood, Micronesian interests must be the primary focus, with “strategic denial”104 as 
more of a positive externality for the United States. 
                                                 
103 Krasner, Sovereignty, 20. 
104 U.S. Government Accountability Office, GAO-02-110: Kwajalein Atoll Is the Key U.S. Defense 
Interest in Two Micronesian Nations (Washington, DC, 2002), 8, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-02-
110. 
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c. Title I: Domestic Sovereignty 
Under Article VII, any persons “acting on behalf of the Government of the United 
States”105 may be exempted from Micronesian criminal jurisdiction upon U.S. 
notification. This provision reduces domestic sovereignty a step further than those limits 
imposed by sovereign immunity. So far no evidence exists that this provision has been 
abused, and an incident concerning misconduct by foreign contractors would be a public 
relations disaster for the United States. Still, the limitation on domestic sovereignty is 
worth noting. As a small state, the FSM is more vulnerable to damage to its infrastructure 
and finances and must still properly vet those designated to provide assistance. 
d. Title I: Interdependence Sovereignty 
Under Article IV, Micronesian citizens are permitted to live and work in the 
United States indefinitely without a visa.106 Article IV also requires “no less 
favorable”107 terms regarding U.S. citizens desiring to live and work in the FSM. This 
represents a loss of interdependence sovereignty for the Micronesian government, but one 
proportional to the economic opportunity provided to its citizens through migration. What 
keeps Article IV from harming Micronesian interests is that foreign visitors may not own 
land, whereas Micronesian citizens in the United States are not so restricted.108  
Despite being a net benefit today, with a mostly theoretical loss of sovereign 
control, Article IV still has the potential to severely degrade interdependence sovereignty. 
If the Micronesian economy were to fail completely, whether due to the end of Title II 
grants or to mismanagement by the public sector, there is little the national government 
could do to prevent a mass exodus of population. Compounding this potential problem is 
the fact that some U.S. states and territories provide public support to COFA migrants 
that may exceed what they could earn in the private sector, whether at home or abroad. 
                                                 
105 U.S.–FSM Compact of Free Association, Title I, Art. VII. 
106 Ibid., Title I, Art. IV. 
107 Ibid. 
108 U.S. Department of State, 2013 Investment Climate Statement—Micronesia (Washington, D.C.: 
U.S. DOS, 2013), https://www.state.gov/e/eb/rls/othr/ics/2013/204694.htm. 
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Chapter V discusses ways to adjust the incentives provided by Title I rights, in particular 
with regard to the privileges and obligations of Micronesian citizenship. 
e. Title I: Results 
Overall, Title I strengthens the FSM’s position with minimal cost to sovereignty. 
The free migration provisions in Article IV are currently essential to the economy, and 
reciprocal permission for U.S. visitors does not negate the benefit of reduced population 
and resource pressure in the home islands. Title I also directly supports international legal 
sovereignty by recognizing the FSM’s legal standing. The COFA then becomes a 
contract between equals regardless of differences in national power, backed by the 
international community and by the inclusion of Micronesian sovereign rights in 
U.S. law. 
2. Title II 
Title II of the COFA, concerning economic relations, is assessed in Table 2.
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Table 2.   Cost-Benefit Analysis of COFA Title II 
Article Intent Benefit to the FSM Redundant? Sovereignty cost Justified? Net assessment 
Article I: Grant 
Assistance 
Creates 20-year sector grant 
program 
Finances the FSM 
government with sector 
grants and a Compact 
Trust Fund designed to 









Article II: Services and 
Program Assistance 
Extends U.S. government 
programs to the FSM 
Provides USWS, USPS, 
FAA, DOT, FDIC, 
FEMA, and USAID 
services to the FSM 
No 
Requires FSM to 
provide land at no 
cost to support 






Confirms U.S. funding 
pledge; creates audit 
procedures 
Provides legal 
requirement for U.S. to 








Article IV: Trade Defines customs and tariff requirements 
Extends most-favored 
nation trade status to 
FSM 
No 
Requires some FSM 
consultation with 





Article V: Finance and 
Taxation 
Makes the U.S. Dollar the 
official legal tender; 
establishes taxation 
protocols 
Exempts FSM citizens 
from certain U.S. taxes No None N/A → 
 53 
a. Title II: International Legal Sovereignty 
Title II neither supports nor undermines the FSM’s international legal 
sovereignty, but Micronesians may justifiably feel obliged to maintain their own 
bureaucracy alongside the U.S. agencies that provide services. So long as a designated 
Micronesian representative is present to essentially subcontract these services to the 
United States, the FSM government is performing the obligations of statehood; however, 
this representation should be kept as lean as possible unless the aim is to replace U.S. 
assistance with an organic capability. 
b. Title II: Westphalian Sovereignty 
Title II’s negative impact to Westphalian sovereignty comes from the large 
network of economic relationships required to administer grant assistance provided by 
Article I. Most intrusive among these is JEMCO, the Joint Economic Management 
Committee, to oversee the distribution of Compact funding. This committee is made up 
of two Micronesian and three U.S. representatives, one of which is the U.S. Assistant 
Secretary for Insular Affairs.109 The U.S. majority on JEMCO is already a violation of 
sovereignty, both in the international legal and Westphalian areas. The fact that this 
system is managed through the U.S. Department of the Interior (which oversees the 
Office of Insular Affairs) rather than the Department of State does not remedy the 
perception that trusteeship ended in name only. 
In addition to being a public relations liability, Title II’s violation of Westphalian 
sovereignty through Article I has the potential to split the interests of the Micronesian 
people and their state governments from those of the national government. Because the 
national government is the distributor of sector grant funds as well as the primary 
contractor for U.S. federal services, it has a survival interest in maintaining these benefits 
regardless of whether they are used effectively. Even if the current effect on 
socioeconomic outcomes is positive, an external actor still directs the FSM’s course with 
the consent of its top leaders. By contrast, services provided under Article II preserve 
                                                 
109 U.S. Government Accountability Office, GAO-08-859T: Micronesia Faces Challenges to 
Achieving Compact Goals (Washington, DC, 2008), 1, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-859T. 
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Micronesian authority despite the use of American capacity, ensuring that local interests 
are served. Both articles are compromises of Westphalian sovereignty, but only the latter 
reinforces another aspect—domestic sovereignty—in a lasting way. 
c. Title II: Domestic Sovereignty 
Domestic sovereignty is initially improved by Title II, in the sense that the key 
elements of modern society that governments facilitate—transportation, communications, 
health, etc.—are supported primarily by the United States through the FSM government. 
Services and program assistance through Article II, which do not have an expiration date, 
are far less problematic than grant assistance through Article I. 
COFA II created the Compact Trust Fund in order to eventually replace U.S. 
funding of the national government and that of the four states: Yap, Chuuk, Pohnpei, and 
Kosrae. Despite annual decreases in U.S. investment, the FSM government has not 
responded to this incentive, and may not be able to replace the domestic capacity that 
Title II supports in time for the conclusion of sector grants.110 The 2008 GAO report 
concludes that “despite the budgetary impact of declining annual grant assistance, the 
FSM has made little progress in implementing key reforms needed to improve tax income 
or increase private sector investment opportunities.”111 Though Article II services will 
continue, the fiscal gap remains in areas not directly supported by U.S. agencies.  
Despite continued U.S. support of some services, primary fiscal reliance on the 
Compact Trust Fund after 2023 may severely limit the national government’s ability to 
pay those responsible for domestic control. Foreign investment and aid intended to 
replace Compact grants may undermine federal authority. States that do not agree with 
austerity measures may even break away; Chuuk State has already examined the 
possibility of secession as a precursor to solving its fiscal problems.112 Title II is 
                                                 
110 U.S. GAO, Challenges to Achieving Compact Goals, 3–4. 
111 Ibid., 14. 




therefore supportive of domestic sovereignty in the short term, but potentially damaging 
to it in the long term. 
d. Title II: Interdependence Sovereignty 
Title II has no direct effect on interdependence sovereignty. The end of Title II 
sector grants may drive other Micronesian strategies that allow more domestic authority 
over incoming funds, but prevent effective control; the strategic foreign aid discussed in 
Chapter III is an example of economic activity that may challenge the national 
government’s regulatory capability. 
e. Title II: Results 
Title II trades a great deal of the FSM’s Westphalian sovereignty for domestic 
sovereignty, in the sense that the national government retains its leadership but has 
outsourced most key functions of government power and capacity to the United States. 
Title II was initially meant to be a temporary shift towards domestic sovereignty with 
U.S. help until other capabilities could be brought online. What if these capabilities are 
never realized? The U.S. State Department today recognizes that “the FSM’s national 
government plays a central role in the economy as the recipient and distributor of 
Compact funds to the states.”113 This is not a sustainable pattern. The alternative is for 
the FSM government to live within its means, but its current role as the distributor of 
funds and employer of over half the working population makes this problematic.114 
3. Title III 
Title III of the COFA, concerning security and defense relations, is assessed in 
Table 3 
.
                                                 
113 U.S. Department of State, U.S. Relations With the Federated States of Micronesia (Washington, 
D.C.: U.S. DOS, 2016), https://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/1839.htm. 
114 CIA, “The World Factbook: Federated States of Micronesia.” 
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Table 3.   Cost-Benefit Analysis of COFA Title III 
Article Intent Benefit to the FSM Redundant? Sovereignty cost Justified? Net assessment 
Article I: Authority and 
Responsibility 
Establishes U.S. authority 
and responsibility for 
defense of the FSM 
Provides for national 
defense without an 
organic FSM military 
No 
Permits U.S. military 
presence in territory, 





Article II: Defense Facilities and 
Operating Rights 




facilities as needed 
Requires U.S. 
compensation for land 
use; limits land use to 
minimum required; 
provides aids to 
navigation 
No 
This and subsidiary 
agreements permit 





Article III: Defense Treaties and 
International Security Agreements 
Extends other U.S. 
treaties to FSM territory None No 
May subordinate FSM 
interests to U.S. 
interests if third party 
is involved 
N/A → 
Article IV: Service in Armed 
Forces of the United States 
Permits FSM citizens to 
volunteer for U.S. 
military service and 
attend USCGA/USMMA 
Provides opportunity 
for  employment in U.S. 
military and FSM stake 
in joint defense 
No None N/A ↑ 
Article V: General Provisions 
Creates Joint Committee 
to oversee defense 
matters; requires FSM 
consent to be included in 
declaration of war 
Requires U.S. to come 




U.S. required on 
defense matters even 





a. Title III: International Legal Sovereignty 
Title III has no significant effect on international legal sovereignty, though it does 
assert that the U.S. government will “act in accordance with the principles of 
international law and the Charter of the United Nations in the exercise of [defense] 
authority and responsibility.”115 At the very least, this statement describes the norms the 
United States will uphold and provides Micronesians with an avenue for conflict 
resolution should direct negotiations fail. 
b. Title III: Westphalian Sovereignty 
The U.S. military’s right of exclusive access in FSM territory is the greatest 
violation of Westphalian sovereignty in the COFA, but it is one that appears to be 
completely justified. Title III limits the Micronesian government and grants the U.S. 
military significant access rights. On paper and in practice, U.S. defense authority is 
limited by several factors: international norms, cultural sensitivity, and a narrow 
understanding of the scope and object of the U.S. presence. Empirical evidence of 
adverse effects from this sovereignty compromise is sparse. The United States has no 
permanent bases, and military presence usually supports humanitarian assistance. This is 
in contrast to the situation in the Republic of the Marshall Islands, where effects from 
nuclear testing and the base at Kwajalein still dominate the post-independence 
relationship. The legal language of Title III and the accompanying Status of Forces 
Agreement provides a credible constraint to U.S. presence, along with a process for 
dispute resolution that respects both parties equally. 
c. Title III: Domestic Sovereignty 
Two approaches are possible to assessing the domestic sovereignty impact of 
Title III. At first glance, the FSM government appears to have ceded veto power over 
activities within its territory to the United States military. One key factor changes this 
narrative: international legal sovereignty. While control of the U.S. defense relationship 
                                                 
115 U.S.–FSM Compact of Free Association, Title III, Art. I, Sec. 311(c). 
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is a political process and subject to error, the United States is bound by international law 
to respect the goals and wishes of Micronesians. Adverse outcomes from U.S. presence 
are possible, but if Micronesian authorities do not hold the United States to its COFA 
commitments, the fault also lies with them. It is not easy, politically or diplomatically, for 
a small nation to stand up to a larger one—yet much of the current international legal 
regime is based around the legitimacy of such a challenge. 
d. Title III: Interdependence Sovereignty 
As written, Title III does not significantly impact interdependence sovereignty, 
because the meaning of “defense” in the COFA is still tied to a Cold War idea of strategic 
area denial. Though the old enemy was supposed to be the Soviet Union, the new one is 
not necessarily China or even a particular state. The real threat to the FSM’s borders—
both territorial and EEZ—is from unregulated economic activity, including trade and 
fishing. Krasner views this type of activity as a threat to sovereignty based on a lack of 
capability: “The right of states to manage their borders is not challenged, but 
globalization…has eroded their ability to actually do so.”116 Even with some law 
enforcement assistance, such as that provided by the recent ship-rider agreements with 
the U.S. Coast Guard, the FSM still lacks interdependence sovereignty.117 Illegal fishing 
is still viewed as criminal activity rather than as a national security threat specifically 
subject to military assistance. The implications of redefining the threat and possibly 
leveraging Title III to counter it are examined in Chapter V. 
e. Title III: Results 
Title III provides what appear to be benefits from U.S. protection, considering 
that the FSM’s economy does not currently support the military capability required for 
effective defense. It is unclear if the FSM was ever under threat of invasion after World 
War II, though certainly the United States wishes to maintain dominance in the Pacific 
                                                 
116 Stephen D. Krasner, “Abiding Sovereignty,” International Political Science Review 22, no. 3 
(2001): 231. http://www.jstor.org/stable/1601484 
117 U.S. Department of State, “U.S.–FSM Shiprider Agreement Becomes Permanent,” press release, 
May 29, 2008, https://kolonia.usembassy.gov/2008-13.html. 
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without having to coerce smaller nations. Title III’s sovereignty cost is appropriate to the 
benefits, as it is limited to those measures which allow the United States to perform its 
defense responsibility. Micronesians might get more out of this exchange if they redefine 
the external threats actually faced by the FSM, rather than playing along with the notion 
of U.S. and Chinese spheres of influence. 
4. Title IV 
Title IV of the COFA, concerning general provisions, is assessed in Table 4.
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Table 4.   Cost-Benefit Analysis of COFA Title IV 
 
Article Intent Benefit to the FSM Redundant? Sovereignty cost Justified? Net assessment 
Article I: Approval and 
Effective Date 
Approval contingent on 
both parties’ constitutional 
processes 
None No None N/A → 
Article II: Conference 
and Dispute Resolution 
Establishes arbitration 
board to hear Title I, II, and 
IV disputes 
FSM accorded protection of 
international law; Article 
38 of the Statute of the 
International Court of 
Justice applies 
No None N/A → 
Article III: Amendment Allows amendment by mutual agreement 
New treaty not required if 
both parties agree to 
changes 
No None N/A ↑ 
Article IV: Termination 
Provides for termination by 
either party or by both 
parties 
Unilateral FSM termination 
possible through 75% vote 
in plebiscite 
No 
Survivability clause may 
limit utility of FSM 




Article Intent Benefit to the FSM Redundant? Sovereignty cost Justified? Net assessment 
Article V: Survivability 
Provides continuity of Title 
III (Defense) and Trust 
Fund in case of termination 
Allows Micronesia to 
terminate COFA while 
keeping U.S. defense and 
some economic assistance 
No 
No immediate cost, but 
subsidiary agreements 




Article VI: Definition of 
Terms 
Defines terms in the COFA 
and lists subsidiary 
agreements 
None No None N/A → 
Article VII: Concluding 
Provisions 
Calls for each party to align 
its laws and procedures to 
the COFA 
None except reinforces 
equal legal status between 
U.S. and FSM 
Yes None N/A ↑ 
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a. Title IV: International Legal Sovereignty 
Title IV allows mutually agreed amendments without the ratification of a new 
treaty in Article III, and provides a process for termination of the COFA in Article IV. 
Both of these articles support the FSM’s international legal sovereignty. 
b. Title IV: Westphalian Sovereignty 
While other sections of this thesis argue that intentional compromise of 
Westphalian sovereignty is should be limited to the accomplishment of specific 
objectives, the survivability clause of Title IV is an exception. What if the Micronesians 
decide unilaterally that the COFA no longer serves their interests? Article V states that if 
the FSM alone exercises its option to terminate the COFA, the U.S. defense authority and 
responsibility under Title III will continue until 20 years after the effective date, or 
2023.118 The article then calls upon the two governments to “promptly consult with 
regard to their future relationship.”119 
An enduring defense commitment is an arguably fair and up-front provision for 
security during the transition to independence or other political affiliation. Other 
interpretations of the legal language are possible that suggest an indefinite U.S. presence, 
which is problematic for Westphalian sovereignty. Stewart Firth’s argument against the 
fact of Micronesian sovereignty, mentioned in Chapter II, references subsidiary 
agreements that create “a right of permanent strategic denial in the area by the United 
States armed forces.”120 Firth is referring to the original agreements concerning defense 
and status of forces, which have since been rewritten, and to one agreement that 
continues in force concerning “Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Security.”121 The 
major flaw in Firth’s argument is that it relies too heavily on legal interpretation of a rule 
that cannot practically be upheld. Specifically, the United States’ legal recourse if the 
FSM admits other military powers is to withhold Compact assistance—which would 
                                                 
118 U.S.–FSM Compact of Free Association Title IV, Art. V, Sec. 453(a). 
119 Ibid., Section 453(b). 
120 Firth, “Sovereignty and Independence,” 79. 
121 U.S. GAO, U.S. Defense Interest in Two Micronesian Nations, 7. 
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already have been discontinued after a Micronesian assertion of Westphalian sovereignty. 
Furthermore, it is hard to imagine a U.S. military force refusing to leave FSM territory 
upon request of the national government. Still, this is a good thought experiment for any 
smaller nation considering allowing more powerful forces to operate in its territory, as 
empirical evidence of a larger nation’s respect for international norms must be weighed 
against a strictly realist calculus. 
c. Title IV: Domestic Sovereignty 
If domestic sovereignty is indeed reinforced by Title II grants and services, as 
proposed above, then Title IV provides additional support to Title II by ensuring that 
some assistance will continue by mutual agreement following termination. 
d. Title IV: Interdependence Sovereignty 
Title IV does not significantly impact interdependence sovereignty. 
e. Title IV: Results 
Article IV recognizes the FSM’s right to leave the treaty if it no longer serves 
Micronesian interests. As such, it is the most important part of the COFA with regard to 
international legal sovereignty, albeit one that will only be exercised as a last resort. 
D. SUMMARY OF RESULTS 
A short assessment of the impacts of each title on the FSM’s sovereignty is as 
follows: 
• Title I: Provides some essential elements of the FSM’s current economic 
strategy. It upholds international legal sovereignty, with a small 
concession to Westphalian sovereignty. 
• Title II: Funds the FSM national and state governments, and subcontracts 
some services to the United States. Sustains current levels of economic 
activity. On balance, this is detrimental to Westphalian sovereignty, with 
potential negative impacts to domestic and interdependence sovereignty. 
• Title III: Authorizes and requires the United States to defend the FSM. 
These provisions collectively have a negative impact on Westphalian 
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sovereignty, justified by limited scope and object and lack of organic FSM 
forces. 
• Title IV: Enables termination of the COFA by either party or mutual 
agreement. These provisions enhance international legal sovereignty by 
requiring Micronesian consent. 
Not all economic or political benefits provided through the COFA come with 
corresponding sovereignty costs. Title I should be the least controversial, as it formally 
recognizes critical elements of the FSM’s international legal sovereignty without any real 
concession to foreign interests. Title I’s migration provisions, in particular, do not require 
the FSM to support its overseas citizens or to lobby the United States for continued 
access. In fact, the U.S. government compensates the states and territories for “Compact 
Impact,” thus indirectly sustaining even those Micronesian migrants who have not yet 
found work.122 
While Title II provides a significant boost to the FSM’s capacity for governance, 
it does so in part by reinforcing the public sector-led model that has characterized the 
FSM since its independence. Added capacity through sector grants has led to reduced 
authority—not just in the sense of statutory authority given up to JEMCO, but also in the 
sense that Micronesian economic development is subordinated to the COFA’s economic 
incentives. By contrast, government services also provided in Title II are subject to the 
direction of Micronesian officials, who may exercise their authority and increased 
capacity in the pursuit of a variety of political, economic, and social goals.  
Title III also provides the FSM more authority and capacity than it would 
otherwise have. The U.S. military remains legally committed to defend the islands, and 
the Micronesian government can invest its tax revenue more freely without funding a 
military. This arrangement is similar to the situation in post-World War II Japan, South 
Korea, and Taiwan—countries which used an evolving U.S. strategic partnership to their 
economic advantage, despite frequent violations of Westphalian sovereignty. 
                                                 
122 U.S. Government Accountability Office, GAO-13-773T: Guidelines Needed to Support Reliable 
Estimates of Cost Impacts of Growing Migration (Washington, DC, 2013), 2, 
http://www.gao.gov/assets/660/655829.pdf. 
 65 
Finally, Title IV allows the FSM and the United States to change the relationship 
by mutual agreement, or to withdraw unilaterally. The FSM’s international legal 
sovereignty, just as in the other titles, permits its citizens to retain authority—and veto 
power—over the increased political and economic capacity they gain through the COFA. 
E. IMPLICATIONS OF THE ANALYSIS 
With regard to the research question, “how can a freely associated state maintain 
its sovereignty,” this chapter supports one possible answer. A state like the FSM can do 
so by ensuring that the benefits it seeks from protected statehood are otherwise 
unattainable, and that the necessary sovereignty costs do not undermine its legal standing. 
The FSM has optimized these trade-offs in Titles I and IV, and made excessive 
compromises in Title II. Title III is not widely detrimental to sovereignty, but currently 
provides more benefit to the United States than to the FSM.  
What can be done with these results? Though early termination of the COFA 
remains a legal option for the FSM, the conditions identified in Chapter III suggest that 
the impact on the FSM economy and society would be catastrophic. Perhaps a 
reinterpretation of the COFA can provide a set of solutions. If the COFA is already 
understood as a trade of sovereign authority in some areas for enhanced sovereign 
capacity in others, it may be possible to optimize the relationship. 
Joel P. Trachtman’s work on the economic aspects of sovereignty proposes a “law 
of conservation of sovereignty,” in which sovereignty “is never lost, but only 
reallocated.”123 This idea is a useful complement to Krasner’s four types of sovereignty. 
Based on a state’s existing resources, it may have a certain “natural” allocation of 
sovereignty which constrains independent development efforts. In terms of authority and 
capacity, a useful example would be that of a landowner with authority over mineral 
resources, but lacking the capacity to extract them; a reallocation through leasing access 
to these resources would trade authority for capacity, with the aim of benefiting from 
mineral wealth while retaining veto power over the extraction activity. The challenge of 
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Micronesian sovereignty is that the initial allocation of sovereignty attributes was 
artificial, and derived from the U.S.-administered Trust Territory system. Micronesian 
leaders must now make educated guesses as to the most beneficial allocation of 
sovereignty, and for the time being must do so in partnership with the United States. 
A successful reallocation of sovereignty through changes to the COFA might 
allow growth and development that would be otherwise unsustainable, provided that the 
United States remains committed legally and ideologically to Micronesian goals. The 
next chapter will propose changes to the U.S.–FSM relationship, working within the 
boundaries of the COFA, that might restore Micronesian sovereignty to an optimal mix of 
attributes.
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V. PROPOSED CHANGES TO REINFORCE FSM 
SOVEREIGNTY 
This chapter will consider the results of the cost-benefit analysis in developing a 
set of recommendations for each of the four COFA titles. The United States and the FSM 
have procedures in place to modify the COFA or its administration bilaterally, and Title 
IV provides for unilateral or bilateral termination. Unilateral termination by the FSM is 
encumbered somewhat by Compact subsidiary agreements and by the difficulties inherent 
in calling for a national plebiscite, but remains a realistic avenue due to the FSM’s 
international legal standing. 
Short of termination, several modifications are recommended below within the 
existing COFA framework. This would require the parties to move past a Cold War–era 
interpretation of security, as well as an overly simplistic understanding of the post-
colonial relationship. If the desired end-state is still some form of free association or 
protected statehood, a rebalancing of sovereignty, security, and economic interest is 
necessary. For those elements of the COFA that do not require modification, the findings 
in Chapter III and IV should provide a clearer picture of what the current provisions 
actually do for the FSM. Correct understanding of the treaty by Micronesians and 
Americans alike is essential to maintaining a healthy relationship between the two 
countries. 
A. ALLOW DUAL CITIZENSHIP TO REINFORCE TITLE I BENEFITS 
While this thesis asserts that it is in the Micronesian interest to send some of the 
population abroad, especially considering the persistence of family ties that help preserve 
the culture, there is a point of diminishing returns. Title I might hold the greatest benefit 
if overseas workers eventually migrate home, investing their savings and skills from 
overseas labor into Micronesian society and government. Recent work by the 
International Organization for Migration suggests that most do not.124 How could the 
                                                 
124 International Organization for Migration, Migration in the Federated States of Micronesia: A 
Country Profile, 2015 (Geneva: International Organization for Migration, 2016), 71, 
https://publications.iom.int/system/files/pdf/mp_micronesia.pdf. 
 68 
FSM incentivize its most successful citizens in the United States to return? This is 
especially difficult considering that COFA migrants who have become U.S. citizens—
including those serving in the U.S. military, which remains the most direct path to 
naturalization—must renounce their Micronesian citizenship, thus losing the right to own 
land and participate in the political process at home. Title I’s migration provision helps 
Micronesians, but it might not always help the Federated States of Micronesia. The 
recommendation concerning Title I is to permit dual citizenship. The FSM is currently 
holding on too tight to its citizens, and releasing this grip could actually give emigrants 
the freedom to bring their overseas success back home.  
Title I provides economic opportunity to Micronesian citizens, but at the cost to 
the government of some interdependence sovereignty. Chapter III showed how 
emigration could reduce ecological impacts and resource pressure in islands, while 
allowing the relatively free flow of money and people between two states in free 
association. Yet some measure of interdependence sovereignty is necessary with respect 
to the movement of people. Chapter IV notes the potential for a mass exodus from the 
FSM if conditions become significantly better overseas. This could occur due to a natural 
disaster in the home islands, large minimum wage increases in the United States, or the 
inability of the FSM government to pay its workers following the expiration of Title II 
sector grants. 
Even if it can retain a critical mass of citizens, the FSM government’s job gets 
harder with a smaller tax base, as those remaining on the islands may consume more in 
services than they produce in the small local economy. There is also the potential for an 
influx of foreign labor to replace COFA migrants. Regardless of their work ethic and 
contribution to diversity, these workers will have an impact on the ecology and 
infrastructure without being required to assimilate into the Micronesian culture and value 
system. Nor will they be permitted to, as FSM citizenship—with its land ownership 
rights—is difficult to obtain. 
Dual citizenship is currently misunderstood and therefore has not been politically 
viable. A constitutional amendment proposed to permit dual citizenship failed to pass in 
early 2017. In a letter to Pohnpei’s Kaselehlie Press, former FSM president John 
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Haglelgam writes, in opposition to the measure: “Citizens with divided loyalty are not 
compatible to a strong and robust national sovereignty…this proposed dual citizenship 
amendment…would be harmful to our national sovereignty and it is an impediment to the 
development of nationalism in our country.”125 Haglelgam’s viewpoint is 
understandable, and though the United States does not expressly prohibit dual citizenship, 
its naturalization oath includes renunciation of “allegiance and fidelity to any foreign 
prince, potentate, state, or sovereignty.”126 There is, however, a provision for modifying 
this oath under certain circumstances; the United States need only add to the list a 
statement to the effect that during the period of U.S.–FSM free association, dual 
citizenship and dual allegiance is consistent with the unique relationship between the two 
countries. 
Former President Haglelgam’s concern about an impediment to nationalism is 
valid, but a policy that handicaps emigrants’ ability to participate fully in their adopted 
country runs the risk of alienating them in both countries. Just as in the other freely 
associated states, emigrants are not leaving out of dislike for their culture, but for 
economic necessity. How would U.S. citizenship improve the lot of COFA migrants? 
Specifically, it would provide privileges appropriate to the responsibilities already 
performed by Micronesians in the United States. These invited guests pay taxes, serve in 
the U.S. military, and participate in civic organizations. In return, they could receive U.S. 
consular protections abroad, be eligible to vote and hold public office, and transfer U.S. 
citizenship to their children without putting their family’s connection to the FSM at risk. 
With these greater protections, U.S.–FSM dual citizens would be more free to prosper 
and build up the resources to help their country of origin, whether by investing from 
abroad or by returning home to own land and participate in Micronesian civil society. 
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B. ALLOW TITLE II SECTOR GRANTS TO EXPIRE ON SCHEDULE 
Title II’s grants and services create an exchange of Westphalian sovereignty for 
increased domestic sovereignty. They allow the United States authority over some 
internal affairs, while giving the Micronesian government greater capacity to govern. 
There is also a point of diminishing returns when it comes to this sovereignty exchange, 
at which the FSM government has reached an unsustainable level of economic 
importance. In American terms, it is now “too big to fail.” While the FSM needs 
resources for governance, it needs a better mix—funding and services that leverage 
Micronesian sovereign authority to achieve beneficial outcomes, not ones that grow the 
size of government and lead to dependency. The recommendation for Title II will be the 
most controversial. Through the forbearance of their elected officials and directly through 
a plebiscite if it occurs, citizens of the FSM should allow Title II sector grants to expire. 
The FSM stands to lose an additional measure of domestic sovereignty in 2023, 
when Title II sector grants expire and the government must subsist on Compact Trust 
Fund proceeds. These funds are projected to be inadequate. One solution would be to 
simply renew Title II support through the implementation of a “Compact III” 
(“Compact II” being the 2003 agreement), but this would still not address the root cause 
of poor incentives for real growth. Furthermore, it would tie future generations to an 
additional 20 years of compromised sovereignty in order to sustain what by then would 
be an inefficient bureaucracy. The FSM faces a “fiscal cliff,” to be sure; forecasts for the 
Compact Trust Fund suggest that approximately $40m/year will remain unfunded after 
trust fund proceeds are applied.127 What if the economic aid provisions do terminate in 
2023, as scheduled? The FSM might then be tempted to sign on to an agreement with any 
country that can fund its government. 
The best way to escape dependency is to let Article I sector grants expire on 
schedule, and rely on a mix of Article II services and non-reciprocal foreign assistance to 
protect the local economy. The Micronesian people should also consider the negative 
effect on Westphalian sovereignty caused by the Joint Economic Management 
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Committee. They should also be aware of the destabilizing effects of uncoordinated and 
strategically-motivated foreign aid flowing in to offset the close U.S.–FSM relationship. 
Such a decision would be alarming to some American officials. U.S. 
policymakers who benefit from the COFA are counting on Title II aid to tie Micronesians 
to the other three titles in perpetuity, allowing a greater compromise of Micronesian 
sovereignty in return for the interests of foreigners. For the citizens of the FSM, the 
primary economic security relationship, consisting of Title I migration and Title II 
services, has been subordinated to the tangible and visible economic assistance provided 
by sector grants. Allowing these to expire would run counter to the interests of the 
national government and perhaps some of the states. Nevertheless, by Micronesian law, 
the decision is not up to them except as individual voters in a plebiscite. 
There is still a role for the United States in providing aid to the FSM. U.S. federal 
programs provided under Title II such as the FAA and FDIC would remain active. 
Money flowing through the Department of the Interior’s Office of Insular Affairs would 
stop, but U.S. foreign aid through USAID and disaster relief through OFDA would 
continue and probably even increase. In addition to sustaining the unique relationships 
provided by Title I’s free migration and Title III’s unilateral U.S. defense responsibility, 
the United States would supply any emergency aid through the same channels as the rest 
of the international community. 
C. PUT TITLE III TO WORK IN SUPPORT OF EEZ ENFORCEMENT 
Chapter IV’s analysis suggests that Title III supports the FSM’s domestic 
sovereignty at the cost of some Westphalian sovereignty. In the exercise of its defense 
responsibility, the United States has the right to restrict access to any other military forces 
within Micronesian territory. This includes land and territorial waters, but not the 
Exclusive Economic Zone. Naval forces are theoretically free to operate throughout the 
FSM’s vast ocean jurisdiction. Citing common misunderstandings of the extent of U.S. 
defense authority, the GAO produced a 2002 study which argued that “from a broader 
regional security perspective, the FSM and the RMI are not currently strategically 
important to the United States. In addition, other defense and security interests cited by 
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U.S. officials…have been overstated.”128 For Micronesians, too, the benefit of U.S. 
military presence might be outweighed by the cost to sovereignty, both real and 
perceived.  
The history of nuclear testing in the Marshall Islands, also a part of greater 
Micronesia, and the presence of a large U.S. base on Kwajalein highlights a general trend 
in the compromise of Micronesian sovereignty, with disproportionate benefit to the 
United States and often terrible consequences to islanders. Unlike the Marshall Islands, 
however, the present-day FSM has no U.S. bases. Though the idea that the U.S. 
government might take control of an airfield or a port during wartime might be offensive 
to Micronesian nationalists, the exercise of this COFA option would be of most use in a 
war that also threatened Micronesians. The cost to Micronesian sovereignty is 
theoretically great but practically small. How could the benefit to the FSM be increased? 
The answer may be a new interpretation of defense: protection against economic 
degradation by external actors. 
In the United States, maritime law enforcement outside local jurisdictions is 
performed almost exclusively by the Coast Guard, though the Navy may operate with 
USCG Law Enforcement Detachments (LEDETs).129 In his 2012 Naval Postgraduate 
School thesis on maritime law enforcement, Dirk Sonnenberg points out that “the United 
States is unique in the separation of law enforcement functions and military functions in 
the maritime service.”130 The Posse Comitatus Act (PCA) of 1878 and a related 
Department of Defense directive prevent the Army or Air Force from being used for 
domestic law enforcement, and the Navy has generally been included in this prohibition 
subject to a Secretary of Defense waiver.131 Law enforcement activities outside United 
States jurisdiction are not subject to Posse Comitatus, so U.S. law does not prevent the 
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Navy from assisting its allies in their home territory. The absence of PCA restrictions 
together with COFA Title III presents an opportunity to redefine the defense relationship. 
The U.S. Coast Guard is currently the lead agency for law enforcement assistance 
in the Freely Associated States. In 2008, the first permanent Cooperative Shiprider 
Agreement between the United States and the FSM entered into force.132 This agreement 
and its later iterations gave the FSM National Police a legal framework for embarking on 
U.S. Coast Guard ships and aircraft. This is a system analogous to that of Coast Guard 
Law Enforcement Detachments (LEDETs) on U.S. Navy ships, with USCG cutters from 
District 14 in Guam providing logistical support and armed backup to local authorities 
conducting boardings and direct enforcement activities. 
The Coast Guard’s support of cooperative law enforcement in the Freely 
Associated States is commendable, but is not necessarily the most efficient way for the 
United States to provide support. The recommendations for COFA Title II are based on 
the idea that the FSM should limit the duplication of government activities that the 
United States must already provide subject to Micronesian direction. Investment in long-
range patrol boats is not necessary for the FSM, as it already has access to ships by treaty. 
The FSM should instead continue to train and equip its law enforcement teams, which are 
relatively inexpensive, and leverage the United States Navy’s superior capabilities to 
allow Micronesian LEDETs complete coverage of the EEZ. The resulting relationship 
will provide benefits to both countries. The United States would have a greater measure 
of maritime domain awareness, as well as an excellent exercise area for its new patrol 
assets, such as the Littoral Combat Ship and the P-8A. The FSM would gain a consistent 
capability to enforce its fishery regulations and derive necessary income from licensing, 
and would attain the level of interdependence sovereignty that it needs for greater 
involvement in the global economy. 
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D. CALL FOR A RECURRING PLEBISCITE FOR THE COFA 
Because it was accepted by plebiscite in the FSM and by Congress in the United 
States, the COFA is a personal contract between the United States government and the 
people of Micronesia. The newly-established Micronesian government was the signing 
authority in this contract, but the continuing relationship does not depend on its approval; 
the actual sovereignty in terms of the COFA lies with the people. Still, sovereignty 
without the opportunity to exercise it—authority without capacity—is not really 
sovereignty at all. What adjustment to policy could be made in light of Title IV’s 
modification and termination provisions? The recommendation here is to make the 
necessary plebiscite for COFA termination into a recurring event, whether on a five or 
ten-year schedule. Rather than make unilateral Micronesian termination more likely, this 
would restore the perception of popular sovereignty that is often obscured by high-level 
negotiations between governments. For the FSM national government, a recurring 
plebiscite would reduce the chance that peaks in public discontent with the U.S. 
relationship would coincide with congressional support for a prompt national vote. 
E. MICRONESIA’S WINDOW OF OPPORTUNITY 
The recommendations proposed in this chapter may seem rather drastic 
considering the relative stability of current economic patterns. That being said, 2023—the 
end of sector grant funding and U.S. contributions to the Compact Trust Fund—is less 
than seven years away, which means that preparations to negotiate a COFA III are 
imminent. To this end, the FSM government has contracted with U.S. lobbying firm 
Arnold & Porter to help reach its “legal and public policy goals in relation to the 
Compact of Free Association as amended in 2003, positioning the FSM for future 
negotiations, with the U.S. government, and assisting the FSM in other international 
efforts.”133 This $500,000/year arrangement may be directed toward securing a U.S. 
guarantee of additional grant money, but foreign aid and the potential for strategic 
relationships with other global powers will no doubt be discussed as well. 
                                                 




It is vital that the Micronesian people understand what is being done in their 
name, regardless of how they vote when they are given the opportunity. The options 
available to the FSM are often presented as stark choices between autarky and 
dependency, or between full political independence and neocolonialism in fact. The 
recommendations in this chapter provide a middle ground between two political 
extremes: termination of the COFA and acquiescence to a political and economic 
relationship that does not serve the best interests of either party. The concluding chapter 
will examine four possible futures for the Federated States of Micronesia, suggest steps 
that the United States could take to facilitate necessary changes, and propose a revised 
understanding of the relationship known as free association. 
  
 76 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 77 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The research question asked how a freely associated state—a smaller entity 
seeking the economic benefits of political interdependence with a larger one—could 
maintain its sovereignty. Chapters II–IV examined whether sovereignty was still possible, 
proposed reasons why its compromise might be desirable, and examined the effects of the 
Compact of Free Association on Micronesian sovereignty. Chapter V proposed 
adjustments to the existing relationship in the name of increased sovereignty; specifically, 
of the types that the FSM needs to pursue its goals. These recommendations are not the 
only changes possible, but taken together they represent one course of action available to 
Micronesian and American policy-makers in the near term. The fact of Micronesian 
sovereignty means that a number of political and economic trajectories are possible, all of 
which are contingent in some way on the future of the COFA. 
A. FOUR POSSIBLE MICRONESIAN FUTURES 
The status quo is not sustainable. The FSM’s current trajectory will result in a 
huge budgetary shortfall after 2023, and the close connection between the national 
government and economic activity means that this shortfall will have a real effect on the 
population that foreign aid may not be able to offset. The following are four possible 
futures for the FSM in light of the expiration of COFA Title II grants. 
1. Apply Changes to COFA Implementation 
If the changes in Chapter V are applied, the FSM’s economy may still not 
improve overnight, but key obstacles to the effective exercise of Micronesian sovereignty 
will be removed.  
Dual citizenship will allow Micronesian citizens the safety net that their own 
country is unable to provide, while giving migrants the incentive to remain connected to 
their home and culture. Title I will no longer support a one-way export of population, but 
a two-way exchange in which returning Micronesians can reinvest in their land using 
skills, knowledge, and funding acquired abroad. 
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The most difficult policy for Micronesian leaders to stomach—allowing the 
expiration of sector grant funding—need not represent a cut to the government’s 
capability, but a reallocation of effort towards those programs and services already 
provided by U.S. agencies in Title II. This should be done well before 2023; the problem 
with Title II sector grants is not the total amount provided by the United States, which is 
comparatively tiny, but in how the funding reaches the Micronesian people. Increased 
U.S. agency support can still provide local jobs without growing the size of the 
bureaucracy. 
A new approach to defense through maritime law enforcement, supported by the 
U.S. Navy, will change the U.S. military’s image from that of a potential occupation 
force to that of a treaty partner supporting real Micronesian interests. Compromised 
Westphalian sovereignty will appear correctly to be shared sovereignty; the United 
States’ superior capability harnessed to Micronesian legal authority, in the interests of 
both. 
Finally, even if it is the only recommendation adopted, a regularly scheduled 
plebiscite should be established well before 2023—in particular before the plebiscite 
necessary to adopt a new COFA, with further economic support provisions. This is 
critical to assessing the extent to which the people agree with their elected government 
concerning the benefits of free association.  
2. Extend Economic Provisions in COFA III 
In light of the impending fiscal cliff, the most likely course of action for the FSM 
national government is to draw up a “COFA III” with the United States. This would be 
undesirable, not because the funding is unnecessary, but because the manner in which it 
is to be delivered grows the size of government and reduces Micronesian sovereignty—or 
the perception thereof, which is also important. Any new proposal would be delivered to 
the Micronesian people just as huge cuts to government funding became imminent. 
Failure of the Compact Trust Fund to support current levels of expenditure would 
correctly be seen as a result of mismanagement, and the likely result would be more U.S. 
control. This was also the outcome of the 2002 negotiations to extend and modify U.S. 
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financial support. Francis X. Hezel said of Compact II in 2003: “No multi-national donor 
nor international organization, even the most heavy-handed, has yet demanded such 
broad financial control as to give them veto power over every dollar spent.”134 This time, 
it would be the FSM national government insisting on increased U.S. control, in an 
attempt to ensure the survival of the bureaucracy. Though public sector-led development 
is possible, a COFA III would hinder a proper assessment of what parts of the FSM 
government are working for the people and what parts no longer pull their weight. 
3. Pursue Free Association with Alternate States 
If Micronesian citizens consider the relationship with the United States to be too 
closely linked with postwar trusteeship and dependency, the FSM could enter into a 
COFA with any number of other partner nations. While ideological alignment with the 
United States and its allies is not necessary, a new COFA must still adhere to similar 
precepts: free migration, credible defense capability, and increased political and 
economic capacity. In keeping with its recognition of “One China,” the FSM may favor 
the PRC as a future benefactor, but the Chinese mainland is unlikely to accept and 
provide for COFA migrants with its already huge population. Furthermore, the close 
relationship between PRC state and business interests has the potential to make the FSM 
into a reservation for indigenous peoples like Tibet has become—an outcome the United 
States has generally tried to avoid in the Pacific, however imperfectly.135 
New Zealand is a more realistic candidate for an alternate COFA. First, it has a 
long history of shared sovereignty with the Māori people, in a disputed but still relevant 
relationship established in the 1840 Treaty of Waitangi. Despite violations of the Treaty, 
mostly by non-Māori, the government established a tribunal in 1975 to address claims 
and attempt to balance the relationship.136 In light of their renewed commitment to 
maintaining Māori autonomy within national borders, New Zealanders on the whole are 
                                                 
134 Francis X. Hezel, “Power or partnership? Making Compact II Work,” Micronesian Seminar online 
accessed May 8, 2017, http://www.micsem.org/pubs/counselor/frames/powpartfr.htm. 
135 Peter Hessler, “Tibet Through Chinese Eyes,” The Atlantic, February 1999. 
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1999/02/tibet-through-chinese-eyes/306395/ 
136 Claudia Orange, “Treaty of Waitangi,” Te Ara – the Encyclopedia of New Zealand, accessed 23 
May 2017, http://www.teara.govt.nz/en/treaty-of-waitangi. 
 80 
likely to respect the sovereignty of smaller partner nations. The country has a relatively 
low population density, and a military that is already engaged in maritime surveillance 
and law enforcement efforts in the Cook Islands and in Samoa.137 New Zealand’s current 
relations with the Cooks and Niue provide a precedent for free association, but future 
partners need not offer to remain subordinate to the British Crown—instead, the 
protected statehood model might serve as a better example for maintaining the 
sovereignty of any of these South Pacific states as well. 
4. Seek Complete Political Independence 
Economic assessments aside, full and unimpeded sovereign rights may be more 
important to the Micronesian people than what free association may provide. Title IV 
permits termination of the COFA, and before pursuing any number of alternate paths, the 
FSM may decide to assert its full independence. 
This would be a risky move, and one that most concerns the current opponents of 
a national plebiscite. The recent “Brexit,” the United Kingdom’s departure from the 
European Union, shows the hazard of putting sovereignty to a vote during a period of 
economic distress. The people may vote to leave an association based on the perception 
of a loss of sovereignty, and the long-term loss of the capacity provided by the 
association could outweigh the benefit of unencumbered sovereign authority. The 
recurring plebiscite proposed above might well result in a “remain” vote, and move 
concerns over sovereignty to the more useful forums provided within the COFA. 
B. THE ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES 
This thesis has focused almost exclusively on the FSM’s status and available 
courses of action, but the United States could take some simple steps to assist the FSM in 
developing its future plans. The following two suggested improvements to U.S. 
administration are politically uncontroversial, legally possible without an act of Congress, 
and in the spirit of upholding Micronesian sovereign authority. 
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First, the Department of the Interior is the wrong department for the 
administration of Title II sector grants, currently provided under the Office of Insular 
Affairs. Not only is the word “interior” suggestive of a territorial status for the FSM and 
its FAS neighbors, but the OIA’s mission statement includes “providing technical and 
financial assistance to all the Insular Areas”138—effectively placing these sovereign 
countries in the same perceived status as U.S. territories and commonwealths. It is true 
that Guam and the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands share a common 
Micronesian heritage with the FSM, in particular with regard to colonialism and 
trusteeship. While it might be easy for U.S. officials to conflate their histories, the 
Mariana and the Caroline Islands have distinct cultures, and furthermore have chosen 
different paths with regard to sovereignty. The most appropriate department for relations 
with the FSM, RMI, and ROP is the State Department, which already has embassies 
across the FAS and is tasked with conducting relations with sovereign states, not 
territories. Through a formal and timely transfer of responsibility from Interior, the State 
Department could more easily identify COFA grant requirements in concert with its 
existing efforts to channel aid to the islands through partner agencies such as USAID. 
Second, and closely related to the first recommendation, the United States 
Government should come up with a revised interagency plan for post-2023 assistance 
(COFA-related or otherwise) to the FSM. Specifically, such a plan should expand the role 
of agencies that already provide Title II services, in order to address any immediate 
impacts on the population from insufficient Compact Trust Fund revenues. The U.S. 
annual obligation to the FSM is on the order of magnitude of its voluntary contributions 
to Zimbabwe, a country currently under U.S. economic sanctions.139 The amount of 
money involved is not damaging to U.S. interests, but altering the path by which it 
reaches the Micronesian people might better serve their interests. 
A U.S. post-2023 plan should also assert the U.S. commitment to Title I and III of 
the COFA, and should be published for the benefit of all U.S and FSM citizens. 
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https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/zi.html. 
 82 
Currently, the relationship is misunderstood, and the migration and defense provisions 
might be enough to sustain support for the COFA through any necessary realignment of 
economic assistance. 
C. A REVISED UNDERSTANDING OF FREE ASSOCIATION 
The concept of political free association has evolved from its original form under 
the UN guidelines for self-determination. For the Cook Islands and Niue in the South 
Pacific, free association is a voluntary political subordination in return for local 
autonomy. For the Federated States of Micronesia and its North Pacific neighbors, the 
protected statehood model supports the functional exercise of sovereignty: shared 
authority in return for increased capacity. The distinction is small but significant, as the 
restrictions placed upon a protected state are finite in duration. The relationship is a very 
specific kind of treaty, with obligations on both parties. The COFA is intended to create 
formalized interdependence rather than compromised independence, and requires careful 
management to ensure mutual benefits. 
As the Federated States of Micronesia has maintained the most critical elements 
of its sovereignty—its international legal standing and ability to conduct foreign affairs—
the important question is no longer whether the FSM is sovereign, but how it should 
exercise its rights. The concepts explored in this thesis may help frame the challenges 
faced by the FSM, with the understanding that sovereignty implies the right to choose a 
course of action that does not support the interests of current or prospective partner 
nations. Micronesians share an ocean and a significant history with the United States, but 
the decision to change course or to continue on the current one must be theirs alone. 
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